Striving to Revive Pulses in India with Extension, Input Subsidies, and Output Price Supports

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Abstract

Pulse production in India has stagnated relative to staple grains and cash crops, raising concerns about rural protein consumption. We experimentally evaluate an effort to increase local pulse production in Bihar. This intervention consisted of two years of input subsidies and extension to facilitate learning, followed by the creation of marketing organizations and a year of output price support to raise profitability. Farmers respond to price signals by expanding inputs when subsidized and increasing pulse sales under price supports. However, we see no evidence that the program shifted equilibrium production portfolios as pulses return to pre-intervention levels after the support ends. Results indicate that short-term learning-by-doing cannot overcome long-run barriers to local pulse production, even when farmers have a viable outlet to sell surplus.

Keywords: Pulses, India, Technology Adoption, Agricultural Extension

JEL Codes: O13, O33, Q12

1 Introduction

The Green Revolution unleashed dramatic increases in food supply around the world through improved germplasm and agronomy combined with investments in infrastructure, market development, and agricultural extension. In India, agricultural output expanded by nearly fourfold between 1950 and 2000 (Tiwari and Shivhare, 2017), which contributed to impressive declines in food insecurity and malnutrition and improvements in population health and wellbeing (Deaton, 2008). Given the severe food shortages of the 1950s and 1960s, increasing the availability of calories was understandably the primary objective of these efforts, which consequently focused on cereals—primarily rice and wheat in India. While the urgency of producing cheap calories has faded, the legacy of Green Revolution cereal successes continues to shape on-farm production, agri-food systems, and nutritional outcomes.

One dimension of this legacy in India has been a decline in the prevalence of pulses and other crops that received relatively little public investment. Despite being the most prominent source of protein throughout the country, Indian pulse production grew by only 30% from 1950 to 2000, compared to over 300% increases in rice and wheat production. Pulse cultivation in India has retreated to more marginal and rainfed lands and moved further south as farmers in the Indo-Gangetic plain shifted to more productive and remunerative varieties of Green Revolution cereals (Pingali, 2012; Tiwari and Shivhare, 2017).[1]Meanwhile, protein consumption in India continues to fall short of international standards across socioeconomic strata (Sharma et al., 2020). Indeed, Deaton and Drèze (2009) show that per capita protein consumption in India actually declined in the 1990s and 2000s despite rapid economic growth. Seeing a link between cereal successes at the expense of domestic pulse production and stagnating protein consumption, the Government of India has sought to make pulses more readily available in domestic markets.

In this paper, we present results from two randomized evaluations conducted during a three-year pilot program to expand the domestic supply of protein by encouraging pulse production among smallholder farmers using improved seeds and techniques. This pulse support program consisted of two years of input-focused intervention followed by a third year of output marketing support. The input side of the pilot

[1]For a visualization of this spatial shift at the district level, see the maps produced by Tata-Cornell Agriculture and Nutrition Initiative (2015). This shift is also apparent at the household and village levels as the most productive plots with irrigation access are devoted to more productive and profitable non-pulse crops and pulses are pushed to the borders or to marginal, rainfed plots.

program delivered intensive, short-term extension and support by offering certified seeds of suitable varieties available at subsidized prices along with targeted extension services—including local demonstration plots and individualized feedback. In year three, input support concluded and the program facilitated sales of pulse crops through local farmer producer organizations. These organizations aimed to enable grater market access and raise market returns by aggregating smallholder production to sell in bulk. All support efforts were initiated by NITI-Aayog, the strategic planning arm of the Government of India and implemented in five districts in the northeastern state of Bihar, where farmers have followed the regional trend away from pulses toward cereal crops, with the intent to scale up if successful.

The intervention design was motivated by the possibility of path dependence in agricultural technology adoption and productivity. Following decades of extension focus on cereals, the average yield for pulses in Bihar in 2010 was only 10–25% of the estimated potential yield, compared to 40–55% for rice and wheat.[2]Low productivity stems in part from limited use of modern seed varieties and input-intensive farming practices that were the hallmark of Green Revolution gains. In our areas of study, pulses are largely peripheral crops grown from traditional seeds interspersed between other crop rows, on plot borders, or on other marginal land.

Farmers may be hesitant to adopt new techniques on their own if there is a costly period of learning-by-doing or if they are uncertain about the returns. The input package in this study was designed to alleviate these barriers by removing adoption costs and accelerating learning about best practices. In effect, it sought to provide farmers with the same level of extension support for pulse cropping as they had previously received for cereals. These production activities were supplemented with subsequent assistance to raise the returns to pulse cultivation by facilitating the marketing of output.

The primary evaluation in this study randomized village-level farmer groups into a treatment arm that received the comprehensive support package and a control arm that did not. While the extent of public investment entailed in the first two years of this program would be unsustainable as a permanent solution, we investigate whether the experience gained during a short period of intensive investment coupled with a viable market outlet for selling surplus can shift smallholder farmers to a new equilibrium that produces

[2]As reported in the FAO's GAEZ database.

more pulses.

In a second evaluation, we experimentally introduced a supplementary output price subsidy among farmer groups receiving marketing support in the third year to investigate how sensitive a new equilibrium may be to market returns. Price support took the form of either a flat per-unit subsidy or a price floor matching India's Minimum Support Price (MSP) policy, both announced ahead of the planting season so farmers could adjust accordingly. These two arms separately vary expected returns and price risk (see Goyal, 2010; Donovan, 2020) in cultivation decisions. This second evaluation tests whether the shift to a new technological equilibrium can be facilitated by the type of subsidy already in place for other crops in India.

We find input support policies initially encouraged uptake of pulse farming, with evidence that farmers experimented with modern cultivation practices. The fraction of farmers growing pulses was 50–200% greater across three growing seasons in treatment villages relative to control in the first year when pulse seeds were fully subsidized. However, these gains dissipate over the life of the program. The difference in adoption between treatment and control fell by more than half in the second year with partial subsidies, and by the third year after subsidies expired there was no detectable treatment effect. Even those offered output price subsidies do not expand their seed demand or area cultivated. Whatever learning occurred during the subsidy period did not raise the perceived returns to pulse cultivation by enough for pulses to supplant other crops, even with an outlet for sales. If anything, experience reinforced farmers' pessimism about the return to investment in pulses, as farmers who received two years of input support exhibit lower demand for certified pulse seeds in an experimental auction.

Consistent with this behavior, we find no evidence that households induced to grow pulses fared differently than those in the control group across a range of indicators on production, agricultural revenue, sales, and pulse stocks despite heavy input subsidies and extension support. While each individual measure is noisy, the estimated treatment effects are quantitatively small relative to the mean across multiple outcomes and paint a uniform picture: pulse cultivation in Bihar, even under ideal conditions with intensive support, is not more lucrative than the alternative uses of agricultural land. Given the absence of persistent effects on pulse production, we unsurprisingly find no evidence of increased pulse or protein consumption.

In our context, lack of knowledge or experience does not appear to be the binding constraint on adoption of pulses. This conclusion contrasts with an evaluation in the nearby state of Odisha that finds a similar combination of field visits and extension using demonstration plots induced sustained uptake of a new drought-tolerant rice variety (Emerick and Dar, 2021). While much effort in agricultural development focuses on introducing producers to new technology, our findings serve as a reminder that low technology utilization in agriculture need not always be a puzzle revealing underlying frictions. In some cases, the returns to technology are sufficiently low that agents rationally choose not to adopt.

While we do not observe an equilibrium shift in technology adoption, this study provides some evidence for the role of price supports in market development as farmer behavior responds to price signals. On the input side, adoption is greatest in the first year when inputs are fully subsidized and dwindles as subsidies are withdrawn. Those participating in the experimental auction similarly display downward-sloping demand that responds to the seed price. On the output side, while the promise of price support does not promote cultivation, subsidies increase the quantity sold on the market.[3] These results suggest that price supports can supplement other policies by adding thickness to agricultural markets—albeit not by enough to create a persistent, self-sustaining equilibrium.

This research broadly contributes to the literature on agricultural productivity. Raising agricultural productivity is a crucial component of economic development because 75% of the world's poor live in rural areas (World Bank, 2007; Castañeda et al., 2016). Across countries, labor productivity differences between rich and poor tend to be greater in agriculture than in other sectors (Caselli, 2005), and the productivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture is greatest at the bottom of the income distribution (Gollin et al., 2014). Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2021) show that crop selection and input use, rather than land endowments, account for the overwhelming majority of cross-country variation in agricultural productivity. McArthur and McCord (2017) argue improved use of inputs was a fundamental driver of growth in cereals during the Green Revolution. We investigate the potential to extend these gains to pulse crops in India.

Technology adoption is an important component of agricultural development (see de Janvry et al., 2017). To this end, extension work frequently focuses on knowledge and training to promote new technologies (Waddington and White, 2014). However, experimental evidence indicates training alone is insufficient to

[3] The margin of adjustment is likely sale versus home storage.

change farm practices (Fabregas et al., 2017; Kondylis et al., 2017; Maertens et al., 2021). In contrast, programs that augment training with hands-on demonstration and experience have shown greater success (Maertens et al., 2021; Aker and Jack, 2021; Emerick and Dar, 2021), highlighting the importance of either learning-by-doing or learning about the returns to technology (see Magruder, 2018).

Learning frictions are one of many possible market failures that may exist in the agricultural sector (Jack, 2013). Specifically, uncertainty about input quality (Bold et al., 2017; Hasanain et al., 2022) and credit constraints (Magruder, 2018) have been shown to hamper agricultural technology adoption. This intervention resolved the asymmetric information problem by sourcing high-quality inputs from reputable vendors and distributing them locally through trusted organizations with strong community ties.[4] Furthermore, our study population consists of established farmers with pre-existing access to agricultural credit, alleviating another common adoption constraint. Nevertheless, we present a case where knowledge is still not the binding constraint to technology adoption.

Extension and training represent supply-side initiatives to increase agricultural productivity. A complementary approach focuses on demand-side interventions that raise the returns to investment and quality (see Bold et al., 2022; Rao and Shenoy, 2022 for experimental evaluations and Bellemare and Bloem, 2018 for a comprehensive review). Related demand-side factors include contract design (Goodhue et al., 2010; Saenger et al., 2013), market competition (Bernard et al., 2017; Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2021), and quality verification (Saenger et al., 2014; Bai, 2021). A few experimental evaluations bundle supply- and demand-side interventions. Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa (2019); Park et al. (2022) find that training induces greater technology upgrading when farmers are connected with output markets. Our research attempts to simulate market expansion with sales support and experimental price subsidies, but we cannot guarantee subsidies in future seasons. It remains an open question whether a more sustained commitment to higher output prices could promote greater pulse cultivation in the long run.

[4] This distribution network for accessing high quality pulse seeds, which was not experimentally evaluated, remained in place after the intervention period.

2 Background

2.1 Pulses in India

India is simultaneously the world's largest producer, consumer, and importer of pulses. The country produces around 25% and consumes around 27% of the world's pulse crop. Accordingly, pulses make up an integral part of Indian diets, and are a key ingredient in traditional cuisines around the country. Nevertheless, domestic production has lagged behind demand in recent years. From 1995 to 2016, consumption of pulses in India increased at an average annual rate of 2.3%, outpacing the growth in domestic production of around 1%.While imports from Canada, Myanmar, and other nations increased to fill the gap, the pulse sector has still seen steady price increases.

Local access to pulses is particularly important because they represent a key source of protein for Indian households. Pulses account for nearly a quarter of non-cereal protein consumption on average, and are the largest protein source outside of cereals for poor households in both rural and urban areas (Rampal, 2018). Protecting this dietary component is especially vital in a country where the protein content of diets lags well behind international standards across geographic and socioeconomic strata (Sharma et al., 2020). Pulse prices also play a role in macroeconomic and political stability, as unexpected price spikes have forced administrative resignations and induced turnover among elected officials.[5]

To stabilize the national market, the Government of India has explored policy solutions to bolster supply through both domestic production and imports. In the pulse sector, however, trade policy may be unappealing because India is a large enough buyer in the world market that demand shocks can raise prices, leading to increasingly worse terms of trade (Joshi et al., 2016). Furthermore, the gains from trade rely on domestic market integration and therefore may exclude more remote rural markets (Atkin and Donaldson, 2015), making domestic production an appealing alternative (Porteous, 2020).

In this paper, we evaluate an initiative to boost domestic pulse production through agricultural extension piloted in districts in the state of Bihar that had cultivated pulses commercially before the Green Revolution.

[5]See e.g. *The Hindu*, 2015, October 21, "Finally, pulse price is a poll issue in Bihar". NITI-Aayog's interest in reviving pulse production domestically, and therefore its interest in the present study, were partly due to macroeconomic considerations as rapidly increasing pulse prices were a component of inflationary pressures in the early 2010s, driven in part by expensive imports.

This pilot intervention was motivated by the fact that current pulse cultivation in the region typically uses few improved inputs—indeed, few inputs at all—and traditional cropping methods. As a result, not only has the technological frontier for pulses stagnated relative to the frontier for staple grains, but realized pulse yields lag farther behind the technological frontier than for commercial staple crops.[6] While a lack of investment in R&D in pulse breeding explains some of the productivity disparity,[7] agronomists have identified Bihar as an area with the potential for productivity gains in pulses through adoption of existing technology alone (Reddy and Reddy, 2010). The interventions we study follow from the hypothesis that technological sluggishness is path-dependent, such that a one-time investment by the government could raise yields by inducing local producers to permanently shift their cropping techniques and use of inputs.

2.2 Policy Design and Implementation

The pulses program in this study emerged as a joint initiative between the Government of India and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). With support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, NITI-Aayog coordinated with the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and four local rural development NGOs in Bihar to develop a policy package to provide the most favorable conditions possible for pulse cultivation. The package was implemented by the local partners with oversight by AKF over a three-year period, with the intent of scaling up successful components into a state- or nation-wide policy.

The first two program years focused on input support. Project partners established a supply of reliable insecticide-treated, modern-variety pulse seeds, which had previously been difficult to purchase in the area of study. They offered these seeds at a subsidized cost for two years, and provided substantial extension support to program farmers over this period. After the second year, project partners continued to make seeds available at market price. This portion of the study tests whether an intensive, short-term investment in technological upgrading can induce enough adoption to create sustained demand for seed purchases and output sales over the longer term.

In the third year, program activities shifted to marketing output. Implementers assisted farmers that had previously received input support in forming Farmer Producer Companies (FPCs) to secure higher prices

[6] As reported in the FAO's GAEZ database.

[7] This is notable in the absence of high yielding pulse varieties that (i) offer productivity gains on par with those attainable for other crops and (ii) are highly responsive to complementary inputs such as fertilizer and irrigation.

by negotiating bulk sales with traders and processors.[8] The program also experimented in this phase with offering price supports and backstopping the sale price with a floor set to match India's national Minimum Support Price (MSP). The MSP, which had previously only been enforced for cereal crops in Bihar, represents an effort to insure agricultural households against income loss driven by unexpected price fluctuations at the time of harvest. This portion of the study tests whether local output market development could help sustain adoption and measures the elasticity of local pulse supply to the anticipated sale price.[9]

2.3 Geography and Crop Seasons

Program evaluation takes place in five districts in the state of Bihar, depicted in Figure 1. Pulses, especially pigeon peas, are a staple of food consumption in this region, but local production has dwindled in the face of rapid productivity gains in other crops. Current farmers in these districts at most grow small quantities of pulses for household consumption, typically as a border crop to delineate between plots or on other marginal land.[10] Nearly all farm households supplement home production with market purchases despite being net sellers of the other crops in their portfolio.

[Figure 1 about here.]

The region of study follows a two-season cropping cycle. In the main Kharif season, which runs from May through October, farmers typically cultivate rice for commercial sale. More than 85% of control farmers report growing rice in this season, accounting for nearly 75% of farmed land. Maize covers another 9%, while pulses comprise just 3.5% of Kharif acreage in control villages. The pulses program promoted replacing a portion of rice area with pigeon peas (*arhar*) or black gram (*urad*) during this period. It should be noted that pigeon peas are a longer duration crop, so Kharif fields devoted to pigeon peas would remain occupied through both crop seasons.

Irrigation enables a secondary Rabi season that runs from November through February. More than 98% of cultivated plots in our study areas are irrigated, and total area farmed does not decrease among study

[8] Prior to the establishment of FPCs, most farmers that cultivated any pulses consumed the little they produced. A small number operated at a scale for commercial sale and delivered to local traders. Newly established FPCs aimed to offer a sales outlet that improved on the local trader price by negotiating in bulk.

[9] The output subsidy interventions were applied to FPC procurement without scope for renegotiation, and therefore directly passed through to the farmgate price. The complementary question of how farmgate prices would respond if subsidies were offered by the government remains beyond the scope of this study.

[10] For prior generations of farmers, pulses were a much more prominent part of production portfolios in these same districts.

farmers from Kharif to Rabi. The main commercial crop in this season is wheat, grown by over 85% of control farmers and covering 60% of farmed land. Mustard seeds and pulses are the next most common, each accounting for another 11% of farmed acreage. The pulses program specifically promoted red lentils (*masoor*) in Rabi, but implementers also provided extension support for other pulse crops.

In a small subset of project areas, soil conditions accommodate a third Zaid season in March–April. Fields are typically left fallow in these months as this is the hottest and driest time of year. However, in low-lying fields, the soil retains enough residual moisture to enable irrigated cultivation of green gram (*moong*). This season remained a minor focus of the pulse program as it was only viable for a small fraction of project farmers and could not scale up to other parts of the state or country.

3 Research Design

We evaluate two interrelated experiments to measure the effect of input and output market support on farmers' adoption and production of pulses. The input support experiment takes place over the first two project years, spanning six cropping seasons in total. The output support experiment takes place in treated villages from the input experiment in the year after input support expired. In this section we describe the interventions, randomization design, and evaluation data.[11]

3.1 Theory of Change

We first present a simplified model to motivate this evaluation. This stylized model captures the central theory behind the pulse support program that, with access to quality seeds, new varieties, improved inputs, and better agronomy, farmers can significantly enhance their productivity with pulses compared to traditional production methods. Upgrading is captured by a shift from traditional to "modern" pulse production techniques at the core of this simple model.

Consider a farmer that can produce output using either a traditional (L) or modern (H) production technology. In a cropping season, the farmer chooses a technology $T \in \{L, H\}$ and a level of inputs x, and then produces output $f_T(x)$. Under the traditional technology, let $f_L(0) = 0$, and let $f_L(x)$ be increasing

[11] Both components were pre-registered with the AEA RCT registry as AEARCTR-0003872 and AEARCTR-0004393.

and concave in inputs. The modern technology requires up-front investment (e.g. for hybrid seeds), so that $f_H(x) = 0$ when inputs fall below some threshold $x \leq \underline{X}$. Let $f_H(x)$ also be increasing and concave above this threshold. Further, let there be a crossover point $\overline{X}$ below which $f_L(x) \geq f_H(x)$ and above which $f_L(x) \leq f_H(x)$. That is, at low input levels, the traditional technology produces more, but with sufficiently high investment, the modern technology dominates.

Figure 2a represents the pre-intervention equilibrium with low technology. Farm profits can be written as revenue minus cost, that is $\pi(x) = pf(x) - x$. For each technology, farmers maximize profits by choosing inputs so that the slope of the production function equals the (inverse of) market price.[12] Farmers choose whichever technology delivers higher profits at this price, which in this case is the traditional technology.

The primary intervention lowers the required level of investment $\underline{X}$ for the modern technology by subsidizing modern inputs. This treatment, which effectively shifts the farmer's modern production function to $f_H(x+s)$ for a subsidy value s, is depicted in Figure 2b. The policy package provides enough support that adoption becomes profitable.

With intensive extension, we test the hypothesis that experience raises the return to inputs in the modern technology. This can be most directly attributed to learning-by-doing. If there are returns to experience in production, then a one-time policy that provides the impetus for initial adoption can raise profitability to sustain modern practices in the long run. This effect is described conceptually as a post-intervention production function of $f'_H(x) > f_H(x)$ in the domain $x > \underline{X}$, as depicted in Figure 2c. We test this hypothesis against the alternative that post-subsidy production returns to the equilibrium in 2a.

A related possibility is that experience resolves uncertainty about returns. If farmers are risk-averse and heterogeneous in ability, then uncertainty about their private returns to a new technology can lower the expected utility of adoption. Even if experience does not alter any individual's productivity, it can induce greater adoption on average if it gives individuals more precise information about where they fall in the population distribution. Without an independent measure of farmer ability, we cannot differentiate between these mechanisms. Nevertheless, both theories generate the prediction that a short-term intervention to

[12] This formulation with linear isoprofit curves abstracts from the opportunity cost of cultivating pulses in lieu of competing crops. If farm-level constraints—such as in land availability, credit for inputs, or managerial capacity—lead pulses to displace other crops, this would appear in the model as convex isoprofit curves as the shadow value of the constrained factor would increase with pulse scale. The main qualitative insights of the model would remain unchanged in this alternative formulation.

promote adoption of a new technology can induce a persistent increase in utilization.

Marketing support complements the input intervention by augmenting the sale price. Raising the output price leads to flatter isoprofit curves, and if the price is sufficiently high then the modern technology becomes optimal as depicted in Figure 2d. In the first experiment, we support sales through FPCs that can negotiate in bulk, and in the second experiment, we measure the added value of an additional output subsidy. Furthermore, we explicitly test the role of risk relative to expected return in the second experiment by varying whether the subsidy is applied uniformly across the distribution of possible outcomes or selectively insures against low price realizations in the form of a price floor.

[Figure 2 about here.]

3.2 Description of Interventions

We evaluate two sets of policies intended to increase pulse production in our areas of study. The primary intervention aims to trigger permanent change in cropping practices with an input-intensive package of short-term support along with an attractive outlet for sale of surplus. The secondary intervention tests whether changes in cropping practices can be sustained through subsidies to the sale of outputs.

3.2.1 Primary Intervention: Pulse Promotion and Support

The input support package consists primarily of input subsidies combined with extension support for a two-year period spanning four cropping seasons. Project implementers sourced pesticide-treated, certified seeds for high-yielding varieties of pulses from a seed bank for distribution to farmers. In the Kharif season, the intervention included seeds for pigeon peas and black gram, and in the Rabi season offered seeds for red lentils. Pulse breeders in national and international research centers recommended new varieties of these crops that had performed well in trials and were well-suited to local agro-ecological conditions.[13] Local agronomists provided specialized extension support for the promoted crops as well as additional guidance on other pulse crops, most commonly fava beans and green peas.

[13]Seeds for these new varieties were mostly unavailable to farmers in these districts given the poorly developed seed system for pulses in Bihar. Specific recommended varieties included GS-10 (peas), IPU 94-1 (black gram), NDA 1 and NDA 2 (pigeon pea), HUL-57 (lentils), IPM 02-03 (green gram), and PG-186 (chick peas).

In the first year, pulse project farmers had the option to receive pulse seeds for free under the soft conditionality that they plant what they receive and not resell. In the second year, subsidies were scaled back to 50%, and from the third year onward seeds were sold at market prices. These subsidies temporarily lowered the cost of adopting modern pulse varieties. Through the life of the experiment, farmers in control villages had the option to purchase project seeds at market price as well. Therefore, the intervention tests the marginal effect of temporary subsidies and extension while holding market access to input quality constant across treatment and control arms.

Input subsidies were combined with agricultural extension. In the first study year, extension intensity in treated villages varied experimentally as well. One third of treated villages received a high-intensity extension package where agronomists managed demonstration plots to showcase best-practices and made two visits per month to provide individualized feedback and support. The remaining two thirds of treatment villages retained access to free seeds but received minimal extension, with between zero and two total visits by extension agents to conduct group training without hands-on demonstration or individualized feedback. In the second year, all treatment villages received high-intensity extension, so all treated farmers had seen demonstration plots and received individualized feedback by the end of the two intervention years.[14]

Extension services focused on best practices for pulse cultivation. Agronomists provided detailed guidance on row planting, spacing, appropriate use and timing of irrigation and fertilizer, and other techniques to maximize yield. In our areas of study, such practices are already commonly used in the cultivation of rice, wheat, and other commercial crops. However, pulses tend to be grown along plot borders or on other marginal land using low-quality seeds and low-intensity agricultural techniques. Therefore, the highest intensity intervention package was designed to maximize the potential for crop-specific learning among adopters.

At the end of the two input support years, the program offered pulse farmers an outlet to sell their surplus pulse production. Implementers established FPCs in treated areas to enable bulk sales of pulse production. These FPCs negotiated directly with millers to secure higher prices than were available in the local market, with the gains reflected in the FPC procurement price.

In treated villages, activities were channeled through a village farmer group. Farmers planning to cultivate

[14] After the second year, implementers remained involved with project villages and may have provided informal guidance, but no funding was allocated to these activities.

pulses joined the farmer group, and the group was responsible for delivering subsidized seeds, announcing extension visits by agronomists, and all other pulse-related interventions. FPC membership also drew heavily from farmer group members who wished to continue commercial pulse cultivation. No such group was formed specifically for pulses in control villages, but farmer groups for other crops and investments existed in the region throughout the duration of the experiment.

3.2.2 Output Intervention: Price Support

The output experiment tests the price elasticity of pulse supply by offering price supports to producers. Supports took the form of either a per-unit subsidy or guaranteed price floor, matching India's MSP program, to separately identify farmers' sensitivity to expected returns and to risk (see Donovan, 2020).

This intervention was implemented exclusively within treated villages from the input experiment, and took place in year three during the two cropping seasons immediately after input intervention activities had concluded. In this second experiment, villages were assigned to either control, where farmers could sell output at the market rate secured by the FPC, or to one of two treatment arms where this rate was augmented by a price support for black gram in the Kharif season and red lentils in the Rabi season. Treatment status was announced ahead of the planting season to allow participants to adjust inputs according to their anticipated returns.

Farmers in half of treated villages in this experiment received support as a price floor. The floor was set to match the MSP offered by the Government of India, which was Rs. 56 ($0.80) per kilogram for black gram and Rs. 44.75 ($0.64) per kilogram for red lentils in the experiment year.[15] This policy effectively eliminates very low sale price realizations. As a result, it both raises the expected returns to pulse sales as well as lowers the ex ante variance of possible returns.

In the other half of treated villages, farmers were offered a per-unit subsidy to raise expected returns without altering variance. We calibrated the subsidy level using historical data on inflation-adjusted local harvest prices in the eleven years prior to the experiment. On average, the MSP would have delivered a premium of Rs. 6/kg for black gram ad Rs. 2/kg for lentils were it enforced, so per-unit subsidies were set

[15] While the MSP is a national policy, it was never implemented in Bihar. Therefore, it was not binding at the time of the experiment, and local wholesale prices had fallen below the MSP level multiple times in years prior.

to match these average premia. See Appendix A.4 for calibration details.

Subsidies were applied directly to FPC procurement, and FPCs did not have the opportunity to renegotiate with subsidized farmers. Therefore, this intervention can be seen as a direct shock to the farmgate sale price, and we measure the output elasticity in the context of FPC procurement. It remains an open question how comparable subsidies applied at other stages along the supply chain may pass through to farmgate prices or otherwise alter production behavior.

3.3 Randomization and Sample Selection

Both experiments employ village-level randomization. The primary experiment comprised 158 villages, out of which 99 were assigned to receive input support over two years. Among treated villages, extension intensity experimentally varied for one year with 33 villages receiving the full extension package and 66 receiving only subsidized seeds with minimal extension. In the second year, all treated villages received the full support package with demonstration plots and individualized feedback. Input subsidies and extension concluded after the second year, and newly formed FPCs recruited farmers from treated villages for marketing support in the third year. The randomization design for the primary experiment is outlined in the top part of Figure 3. Village-level randomization for this experiment was stratified by block (a subdistrict administrative unit typically comprising several dozen villages) with two participating blocks in each district.

[Figure 3 about here.]

Primary outcome data come from surveys of a random sample of farmers in each study village. To ensure experimental comparability across treatment and control arms, we selected the survey sample before assigning treatment status. At the start of the study, ahead of the initial Kharif planting period, we held a kickoff meeting in each study village to identify farmers potentially interested in growing pulses. We then randomly selected around seven households per village from kickoff meetings that make up the survey sample for the life of the experiment. This strategy ensures that sampling is not influenced by project participation in treatment villages.

Table 1 provides baseline summary statistics for households surveyed as part of the first experiment. The first survey round took place after the initial experimental Kharif planting, so we restrict balance tests to slow-moving measures of household demographics. In each household we conducted simultaneous surveys with both the main farmer as well as the primary food preparer. The first two panels present details about survey respondents. Farm respondents, predominantly male, are typically near fifty years old, and over half have completed primary education. The primary food preparers, almost exclusively female, are typically in their mid thirties, and equally as well-educated as the farm respondents. The two respondents were frequently spouses, but father-in-law/daughter-in-law pairs were also common. The third panel of Table 1 presents household characteristics for the study sample. Notably, nearly two thirds of study households have planted pulses in some form in the past, predominantly as a border crop for home consumption.

[Table 1 about here.]

Despite randomization, Table 1 reveals imbalance between treatment and control along several dimensions. Treated households tend to be slightly smaller on average, with slightly more educated primary farmers. Consistent with this educational gap, treatment households report owning more assets on average, though the scale of farming is consistent across study arms. Covariate imbalance may arise due to randomization error or selective attrition from surveying after treatment status was announced. To minimize its potential influence, all analysis controls for household characteristics and respondent demographics as prespecified. In Appendix B.1 we confirm all findings are robust to using post double lasso for covariate selection (Belloni et al., 2013) and reweighting for entropy balance (Hainmueller, 2012).

The secondary output support experiment took place in the third project year, after input activities concluded. Farmer groups from 82 of the 99 treated villages were incorporated into FPCs[16] along with producers from 70 non-study villages that had also previously received the input support package. FPCs agglomerate production to sell in bulk to local traders. Farmers in the 152 FPC villages that had previously received input support were randomly assigned to either receive the standard FPC price, the FPC price plus a fixed subsidy, or the FPC price with a price floor, with assignment spanning the Kharif and Rabi seasons. Figure 3 outlines the full randomization design with transitions across years.

Village-level randomization in the output support experiment is stratified by prior treatment assignment and by FPC board representative. FPCs are managed by a board of directors with each director representing

[16]One block was dropped due to pre-existing FPC activity.

a group of member villages. These groups serve as a dimension of stratification to minimize possible noise introduced by heterogeneity in directors' level of engagement. Evaluation data for this experiment comes from FPC administrative records.

Evaluation data for the second experiment come from newly created FPC administrative records, so no baseline exists. To test for balance in randomization, we match study villages to the 2011 Socioeconomic and Caste Census (CSO, 2011; Asher et al., 2021) using village names and geolocations recorded by program implementers. We are able to match 98 of 152 study villages distributed evenly across treatment assignment. The majority of unmatched villages come from the West Champaran district, where implementers recorded the farmer group headquarter location rather than village details. Table 2 reports village means by treatment assignment for demographic characteristics and agricultural intensity. A joint F–test fails to reject equality across groups over all characteristics.

[Table 2 about here.]

3.4 Data Collection and Analysis

Data for the primary evaluation come from a series of household surveys asking about agricultural input, production, and consumption. In the third study year, we also conduct an incentive-compatible elicitation of demand for pulse seeds. Data for the output price evaluation come from FPC administrative records. Because all interventions are implemented experimentally, analysis follows a straightforward regression design with dummies for treatment status.

3.4.1 Household Survey Data

Data for the primary evaluation come from six rounds of surveys that took place over the three intervention years. Surveys are conducted in May/June after the Rabi (and, if applicable, Zaid) harvest and in November/December after the Kharif harvest. This timing allows us to ask about both the output from the previous harvest as well as planting and input decisions for the coming season. We preserve the same survey households over time to generate a panel spanning the life of the experiment.

In each survey round, we separately interview both the primary farmer and food preparer, typically a husband and wife pair. Farm respondents are asked about agricultural inputs, production, and profits. Food preparation respondents are asked about food consumption and seed stocks. This breakdown corresponds to typical domains of responsibility in our study area.

The final survey round was scheduled for June 2020 after the conclusion of all experimental activities. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this survey was pushed back to August and conducted by phone rather than in person. As a result, only a subset of outcomes are available from this round. Regression analysis controls for level differences between phone and in-person responses through survey round fixed effects, so that all experimental comparisons are made between treatment and control farmers within the same survey round.

3.4.2 Experimental Seed Auction

Additional evaluation data come from two incentive-compatible seed demand elicitations. These elicitations were conducted as experimental auctions (see Lusk and Shogren, 2007) prior to the third-year Kharif and Rabi planting periods.[17] The timing of these auctions was an essential part of the research design. They were conducted after the input intervention had concluded, so comparing seed demand in treated villages relative to control provides additional evidence on the sustained effects of temporary input support.

Demand was elicited using an incentive-compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. Participants were given a list of possible prices for insecticide-treated seeds for high-yielding varieties of pigeon pea and black gram in Kharif, and of red lentil in Rabi. They report quantity demanded at each possible price, and then one price was selected at random for actual purchase. To ensure incentive-compatibility, participants could not adjust their quantity demanded after the price was announced.[18] This mechanism provides an incentive-compatible elicitation of each participant's demand curve over a range of prices. We are limited to eliciting demand at or below market price because participants can always buy seeds in the market outside the elicitation.

In practice, participants bid on a coupon for certified seed sourced by the FPC and associated implementing NGO. This ensured consistency in the product being sold across treatment and control, allowing us

[17]Auctions were integrated into how FPCs and supporting partners elicited seed orders for the upcoming production season.

[18]Participants always had the option to purchase nothing at the experimental price or purchase extra at the market price. In practice, this was rare and nearly all participants purchased their stated demand.

to attribute differences in demand to participants' opinions about pulse cultivation itself rather than about the reliability of seeds or sourcing. Coupons could only be redeemed for the full quantity so that participants could not overstate demand in the elicitation and subsequently readjust downward. Over 90% of coupons were redeemed, indicating participating farmers adhered to their elicited input demand.

3.4.3 FPC Administrative Records

Data for the second evaluation come from FPC administrative records on seed purchases, area planted, and sales. At the time of planting, FPCs took over the NOGs' role of sourcing and delivering certified pulse seeds, which they sold to member farmers at market price. They monitored members' area planted and anticipated output through the growing season to forecast sales volume, and then recorded the actual quantity delivered by each member farmer at harvest. These outcomes were recorded identically across payment arms and are therefore experimentally comparable.

3.5 Methodology

We estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of the primary intervention on the panel of in-person survey outcomes using the regression specification

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{\tau} \beta_\tau T_i \times \mathbf{1}\{t = \tau\} + \alpha_t + \gamma_{b(i)} + X_i'\delta + \epsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{it} is an outcome of interest for household i in block $b(i)$ in year t, and T_i is a dummy indicating the treatment status of household i. The coefficients of interest β_τ represent year-specific treatment effects. α_t are year fixed effects that reflect the control mean, $\gamma_{b(i)}$ control for block-specific fixed effects, and the vector X_i controls for time-invariant household characteristics.[19]

We report the intention-to-treat effect, rather than the treatment-on-treated among farmer group members, because the intervention may have delivered indirect benefits to non-members. Those in treatment villages who did not join the pulse farmer group may have still participated in extension activities, received

[19]For analysis of pulse production, control variables include the farmers' gender, age, and education level, caste, asset ownership at the start of the program, and a binary variable indicating whether the household had cultivated any type of pulses at least once in the two years preceding program implementation. For analysis of consumption in the food and nutrition survey, we control for the food respondent's age and education level as well as other household characteristics.

instructions or seeds from friends or neighbors, or otherwise altered their pulse cultivation. Therefore, we refrain from ascribing program effects exclusively to those that officially joined a farmer group.

Endline results include seed demand elicitations that do not have a panel structure, so we evaluate treatment effects for these outcomes using a simple cross-sectional comparison across treatment arms. Formally, this regression takes the form

$$Q_{icp} = \beta T_i + \sigma_c + \phi_p + \gamma_{b(i)} + \epsilon_{icp} \tag{2}$$

where Q_{icp} denotes the quantity demanded by individual i for seeds of crop c at price p. The coefficient of interest, β indicates how this demand differs on average for individuals originally in treatment villages, and γ again represent block fixed effects.

We further break down treatment status in the primary intervention by first-year treatment intensity. This specification replaces the treatment dummy T_i in (1) with one of two dummy variables, B_i or E_i, corresponding to subsidy only or subsidy plus extension respectively, in Appendix B.2. This heterogeneity identifies the additional impact of agricultural extension in the presence of an input subsidy.[20] In the second year, all treated farmers received the full extension package so heterogeneity in first-year intensity measures the importance of sustained extension over time.

We evaluate the ITT effect of the secondary output price intervention using administrative data from FPCs. These data allow for within-household comparisons across crops for agricultural inputs. Formally, we estimate

$$Y_{ic} = \beta^S Subsidy_{ic} + \beta^F Floor_{ic} + \phi_c + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{ic} \tag{3}$$

where $Subsidy_{ic}$ and $Floor_{ic}$ are indicators for whether household i was offered an output price subsidy or price floor, respectively. This was offered for only one crop per season, so we are able to make within-household comparisons to measure whether households with price supports devoted relatively more resources to the supported crop compared to other pulse types.

[20]Heterogeneity in treatment intensity was initially introduced for a short-term cost–benefit analysis, and its effect on first-year pulse takeup is explored more thoroughly by Anderson et al. (2022).

For sales, we only observe data on the subsidized crop sold to the FPC. Because of this data limitation, we cannot distinguish whether any increase in sale to the FPC reflects displaced sales to other outlets, diminished stocks for home consumption, or, to the extent that production expands, greater marketable surplus. In practice there are few alternative pulse buyers in the market and little evidence of change in inputs, so excess sales likely come out of output saved for home consumption. For sales outcomes, we estimate

$$Y_v = \beta^S Subsidy_v + \beta^F Floor_v + \gamma_{b(v)} + \epsilon_v \tag{4}$$

For this regression we aggregate to village-level production, indexed by v, to account for selection into the decision to sell to the FPC. All specifications use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the village level.

Given the number of survey outcomes, we apply two adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing. First, we group outcomes into families and control the false discovery rate within family following Anderson (2008). Regression tables report q-values that represent the probability of false positives (i.e. the Type I error rate) among statistically significant results using the two-stage procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006). Survey outcomes are grouped into adoption, consisting of fraction adopting and pulse area sown in each season; production, consisting of reported output in each season and total annual months of household pulses; yield, consisting of production per acre in each season; profitability, consisting of net profit, production revenue, sales revenue, production cost, and total area farmed; and pulse consumption, consisting of current household stock, per capita pulse consumption, and per capita protein consumption. Each table of results represents a separate outcome family.

Second, we combine outcomes for production, profitability, and consumption into single indices following Anderson (2008). For each family, an index is constructed as the first principal component among survey outcomes. Principal components analysis for production excludes months with pulses in stock because this outcome is not measured in year three; the index for profitability excludes net profit because it is already a linear combination of revenue and cost; and the index for consumption excludes female protein consumption because it is not measured in the first year. We do not compute an index for yield because there are only 43 farmer-year observations in which a farmer grows pulses, and therefore has measured yield, in all three seasons. Principal components analysis details are presented in Appendix A.3.

Throughout the paper, we preserve a balanced sample by excluding household that dropped out between survey rounds. We discuss attrition in Appendix A.1 and verify robustness to including all survey households in Appendix B.2.

3.6 Timeline

Evaluation ran from 2017 to 2020. The input intervention began with the May 2017 Kharif planting and ran for two years through the May 2019 Zaid harvest. Output subsidies were offered in the third year for November 2019 Kharif and April 2020 Rabi harvests, with seed demand elicitations during the corresponding planting periods. Data collection concluded in August 2020. We provide a full study timeline in Figure 4.

[Figure 4 about here.]

Note that the initial survey round took place during the first Rabi season of the input intervention. In this survey we ask about the prior year's production as well as household demographic characteristics. Although the survey was conducted after the intervention had begun, it is well before the pigeon pea when households would realize the majority of profits or other agricultural outcomes from decisions made in response to treatment assignment. Therefore, we use recall and demographic data from this survey as baseline covariates in regression analysis.

4 Results

In this section we present results on the impact of input subsidies, agricultural extension, and output price supports over three years. Appendix B shows the results presented here are stable across related regression specifications, and Appendix C explores heterogeneity in treatment response by preexisting household characteristics.

4.1 Impact of Input Support on Pulse Cultivation

Farmers expanded pulse production activities when input support was in place, but subsequently scaled back to normal. This fact is most clearly demonstrated in Figure 5. The top row shows the fraction of farmers planting pulses in each season and year of study. The input support program initially increased the fraction of farmers growing pulses by nearly double in the Kharif season, 50% in the Rabi season, and more than triple in the Zaid season. However, these differences dwindled in the second year, when subsidies were lowered. Second-year pulse adoption by treated farmers was statistically indistinguishable from control in every season except Rabi, where implementers focused the most effort. By the third year, when subsidies and extension had ended, pulse adoption among treated households was nearly identical to and statistically indistinguishable from control. Estimates are provided in the odd-numbered columns of Table 3.

[Figure 5 about here.]

Greater adoption was, for the most part, not accompanied by substantial increases in area planted. In the initial Kharif season, the fraction of area devoted to pulses was roughly three percentage points greater among treated farmers than control, with the expansion largely displacing land devoted to rice. The program effect on pulse area is statistically indistinguishable from zero in every other season, and point estimates of the difference in area planted among treated farmers are far smaller in magnitude than the rates of adoption relative to the control mean. Results are displayed in the bottom panels of Figure 5 with point estimates in the even-numbered columns of Table 3. The patterns of adoption and area planted are consistent with treated farmers experimenting with pulses on a small portion of land while subsidies and extension are available, but ultimately rejecting their viability as a major crop.

[Table 3 about here.]

Elicitation of seed demand verifies lower desire for pulse inputs among treated farmers following two years of intervention. Table 4 reports results from our incentive-compatible auction. All survey farmers were invited to the seed auction, but only half elected to participate. As shown in Column 1, the difference in participation between treatment groups is negligible. In each village, survey teams recruited additional volunteers on the day of the elicitation to fill available spots in each session.

[Table 4 about here.]

Seed auction participants reported quantity demanded over a range of prices, and one price was selected randomly for actual sale to ensure incentive compatibility. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 report differences in seed demand by treatment arm. Column 2 measures stated demand at the elicitation. Demand is lower for all seed types among treated farmers. To verify demand is not depressed due to saved seeds[21] from prior harvest years, in Column 3 we report the sum of stated demand and self-reported seed storage. This measure of total planned input use again reveals that post-intervention, there is lower desire to continue growing pulses among treated farmers.

We plot the full inverse demand curve for seeds by crop type in Figure 6. Demand curves are downward sloping, indicating continued input subsidies could help sustain greater pulse cropping. However, seed demand is consistently lower among previously treated farmers than in control at every price. This result would suggest that, to the extent that farmers updated their beliefs about pulses during the intervention period, they inferred that the returns to pulse cropping were toward the unprofitable end of their prior expectations.

[Figure 6 about here.]

4.2 Project Participation and Cropping Practices

The lack of a sustained change in pulse practices was not a result of low interest or engagement among survey respondents. Survey households were sampled from those in attendance at the initial kickoff meeting held before treatment assignment. Kickoff meetings were advertised as forums for farm households interested in learning about modern pulse cultivation, so attendance selected for those most amenable to improving technology. Participant interest is confirmed by actual enrollment, as on average, 54% of treated respondents joined a pulse farmer group.

Average farmer group enrollment masks heterogeneity by district. In particular, only 31% of attendees joined a farmer group in treated villages in Samastipur, well below other districts. Low engagement among the survey sample could attenuate measured program effects if enrollment is a proxy for receptiveness to

[21] Seeds harvested from hybrid cultivars can typically be reused for 1–2 seasons before needing replacement.

the program within the sampling frame. In Appendix B.2, we verify that results using survey outcomes are robust to excluding Samastipur from analysis, indicating that attenuation from the inclusion of uninterested survey respondents is minimal.

Cropping patterns among treated farmers suggest program participants experimented with modern cropping practices. As a proxy for technology, we measure whether a plot is dedicated to pulses as a mono-crop, or whether pulses are intermixed with other crops or grown on border land. Monocropping allows for modern techniques such as row planting, thinning, and targeted application of fertilizer and pesticides as advocated by agronomists. By contrast, with mixed or border cropping, the capacity to implement these practices is limited. To further separate the role of extension from seed subsidies in promoting experimentation, we leverage the fact that in the first year, some treated villages were offered only seed subsidies with minimal extension while others received intensive extension, with extension intensity randomly assigned. In the second year, intensive extension took place in all treated villages.

Nearly all of the increase in pulse adoption was in monocropping. Figure 7 relates cropping patterns by season to first-year extension intensity. Mixed and border cropping of pulses remains stable across treatment and control, but monocropping increases in the first two program years. In Appendix A.2 we provide further evidence that program effects operated largely through farmer group membership. These patterns indicate those affected by program activities used newly available pulse seeds to experiment with dedicated cultivation, and did not just treat the program as a source of cheap inputs for their normal farming operations.

Figure 7 also reveals pulse adoption in the first year was nearly as high among farmers receiving subsidies alone as among those receiving intensive extension support. In the second year, when subsidized farmers received personalized extension for the first time, excess adoption over control was again consistent across treatment arms. That is, after input subsidies, agricultural extension had little additional impact on the extensive margin of adoption. To the extent that it played a role, intensive extension among pulse adopters would have guided experimentation and facilitated learning.

[Figure 7 about here.]

Despite the use of modern cropping practices, we observe little evidence of increased pulse yields among treatment villages. Table 5 reports yields by year and treatment status. Regression reveals no statistically significant difference in yield between treatment and control farmers. In Appendix B.2 we confirm these results hold regardless of first-year extension intensity.

[Table 5 about here.]

Measured yield should be interpreted with two caveats. First, yield is only observed conditional on adoption. Therefore, there may be selection effects in comparisons of yields between treatment and control. If input support draws less skilled farmers or more marginal lands into pulse production, then this may lower realized average yields. Second, self-reported yield measurement is inherently noisy. We construct yield by dividing production by area. Both outcomes are self-reported with noise, and therefore their quotient is likely to include a substantial amount of measurement error. This fact is reflected in the large standard errors on Table 5.

4.3 Production, Profitability, and Household Consumption

The results above indicate by revealed preference that farmers experimented with modern pulse cultivation but did not find it to be more profitable than the alternative. Survey evidence on household production, profits, and consumption supports this interpretation. In Table 6 we show that treatment does not produce lasting statistically detectable difference in pulse production. The first three columns report production differences by season, the fourth column presents results using the first principal component of production across three seasons, detailed in Appendix A.3, and the final column uses the self-reported number of months that harvested pulses lasted in the household.[22] Results suggest that production rose in treated villages in the first year, consistent with the measured increases in adoption, although statistical significance does not survive q-value adjustment. Production subsequently fell to its control level in the following years.

[Table 6 about here.]

Treatment effects on pulse production are estimated with substantial noise. In the first panel of Figure 8 we plot point estimates from Table 6 relative to the first-year mean among the control group, effectively scaling treatment effects into percent changes. Standard errors are large enough that we cannot reject large

[22] Self-reported months post-harvest was cut from the final survey round to save time during phone surveying.

positive effects that persist over time. However, estimated effects on other related outcomes reinforce the notion that low returns to pulse production led cultivation to return to pre-treatment levels over time.

[Figure 8 about here.]

Output can either be sold on the market or consumed at home. Table 7 explores the former outlet through household agricultural profitability, with estimates plotted relative to the first-year control mean in the second panel of Figure 8. Column 1 reports treatment effects on net agricultural profit, which consists of production value (Column 2) less input costs (Column 4). Column 3 restricts to sales revenue alone, omitting agricultural production stored for home consumption. As an alternate measure of anticipated returns to agriculture, Column 5 reports treatment effects on total area farmed across all crops. Finally, Column 6 combines these profitability variables into a single index of the first principal component as detailed in Appendix A.3.

Across all years and all outcomes, the estimated treatment effect on agricultural profitability is quantitatively small relative to the control mean and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Notably, increased household pulse production in the first year did not translate into measurably greater agricultural profits. This fact suggests that even with modern practices and subsidized inputs, pulses are not more lucrative than whatever they displace.

[Table 7 about here.]

Even if pulses do not increase profitability, households may benefit from greater protein consumption and dietary diversity. We investigate this possibility in Table 8, with estimates again plotted relative to the first-year control mean in the third panel of Figure 8. Columns 1 and 2 report households' self-reported remaining stock of pulses at the time of survey, in kgs. and in months respectively. Column 3 reports per capita pulse consumption in the prior week, and the next two columns report daily protein consumption over the prior week. Column 4 presents overall household consumption, and Column 5 focuses on the consumption of the main food preparer, asked only in years two and three. Like in the two prior tables, Column 6 combines these measures into a single index using principal components analysis detailed in Appendix A.3.

Estimated treatment effects on pulse consumption mirror the profitability results. Across all years and outcomes, the estimated treatment effect is quantitatively small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Only self-reported current pulse stocks in year two, after a full treatment year's harvest, have a treatment effect with a p-value less than 0.05, but this effect does not survive q-value correction.

Together, Tables 7 and 8 indicate that increased pulse production in the first project year neither increased farm profits nor did it substantially alter household diets. These null results suggest that households did not see benefits when switching to pulse cultivation, explaining farmers' reluctance to continue without input subsidies.

[Table 8 about here.]

4.4 Impact of Output Price Supports

Increased pulse cultivation encouraged by input support does not persist after supports are removed. In an extension to this paper's input-side evaluation, we investigate whether output price subsidies can complement extension to sustain greater adoption. Table 9 reports the impact of a per-unit output subsidy and a guaranteed price floor on pulse cultivation and sales. Columns 1 and 2 estimate changes in area sown and volume planted, respectively, for the Kharif season. Columns 4 and 5 show the same estimates for the Rabi season. In both seasons, we compare the subsidized crop (black gram in Kharif and lentil in Rabi) to unsubsidized crops within-household. In both cases, we find little evidence that an output subsidy shifts cultivation toward the subsidized crop.

[Table 9 about here.]

Even though the scale of production does not vary with the anticipated output price, it appears farmers respond to price signals at harvest. A per-unit price subsidy increased the sale of lentils in the Rabi season, as reported in Column 6 of Table 9. The price floor arm did not see a comparable increase in sales, likely because the market price was sufficiently high that the floor did not bind in the year of study. This result suggests that, while a one-time experimental subsidy was not enough to affect farmers' input choices, pulse sales respond to price signals. This combination of a sales response but not supply response implies that these farm households were most likely redirecting their produced pulses from own-consumption to sales, but this might be a reflection of the short-term nature of the output subsidy treatment. Long-term price policy may have more success in shifting the equilibrium as markets develop to accommodate transaction volume—and farmers potentially respond by increasing production.

5 Conclusion

The interventions we evaluate emerged as part of the Government of India's response to the growing gap between domestic pulse production and consumption. As a complement to options such as expanding imports (Negi and Roy, 2015) and extending public distribution programs to include pulses (Chakrabarti et al., 2018), this pilot is a decentralized alternative to make pulses more available locally by stimulating smallholder production (Sibhatu et al., 2015). Prior observational studies identify lack of extension and underdeveloped local markets as barriers to pulse production (Joshi et al., 2016), especially in Northeastern Indian states (Pandey et al., 2019), and posit that alleviating these barriers could unlock greater pulse yields and production (Reddy and Reddy, 2010). Our findings indicate that extension is insufficient to convince smallholder farmers to devote land to pulses even when they have access to high quality inputs and a viable outlet for commercial sale. While we see short-term effects of input subsidies, these effects fade as incentives phase out. The only glimmer of learning we detect works against pulses as treated farmers appear to realize anew why they prefer other crops. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that even after providing strong short-term adoption incentives, intensive training, and commercial support, pulses simply cannot displace competing crops given prevailing prices and technologies.

These results stand in contrast to the evaluation by Emerick and Dar (2021) in the nearby state of Odisha, which finds sustained farm-level adoption of a flood-tolerant rice variety in response to a comparable input and learning intervention. While our context and study population are similar to theirs, there is one major difference: whereas Emerick and Dar (2021) consider rice farmers' adoption of a novel variety of the same crop, we evaluate adjustment on the margin of crop choice. Farmers in both locations have scaled back pulse production in recent generations in favor of more profitable rice and wheat production. Convincing them to reconsider pulses is a fundamentally different proposition than getting them to adopt a new and better-performing rice variety.

This difference reflects a lasting legacy of the Green Revolution. Prioritizing the production of cheap staples to meet the caloric needs of the 1940s and 1950s laid the groundwork for the nutritional challenges of today. In recent decades, priorities have shifted to include dietary diversity and micronutrient consumption (Welch and Graham, 2000; Pingali, 2012). In India, protein intake, which lags well behind comparison countries (Sharma et al., 2020), is a leading concern. Since pulses are the main source of protein (Kumar et al., 2017) and have historically been integral in traditional cuisines, increased pulse consumption is seen as an important policy target toward diverse, balanced diets (Tiwari and Shivhare, 2017; Minocha et al., 2019). Even though Indian agri-food markets are better integrated than they once were, household access to pulses remains the most significant barrier to consumption (John et al., 2021), which makes stimulating local production a compelling way to increase local pulse consumption. Yet, the Green Revolution legacy creates strong headwinds for any such effort to encourage farmers to produce the pulses that their grandfathers abandoned.

The potential for on-farm interventions to influence farmers' crop choice is limited by available technology. The varieties of pulses on offer today are not significantly more promising than those of the past. By comparison, rice and wheat varieties have improved dramatically through decades of targeted public and private investment. These technological successes have catalyzed a host of institutions, investments, and policies that continue to favor cereals. Leveling the playing field through agricultural extension and market support cannot substantively alter production portfolios as long as the pulse production frontier lags behind that of alternative crops. Serious investment in breeding and agronomy upstream to extend these frontiers is likely a pre-requisite for the kind of on-farm support we evaluate to bring pulses off the periphery and stimulate local pulse production. As long as the accumulated productivity gains and institutional momentum of cereals persist, it is hard to imagine any on-farm intervention will sustainably convince farmers to give up these favored crops for pulses. This study provides rigorous evidence to back up this hard reality.

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Figure 1: Map of Project Area



Figure 2: Theory of Change



Notes: Production functions and isoprofit curves at the optimal level of production. $f_L(x)$ represents traditional production technology, and $f_H(x)$ represents modern technology. (a) Pre-study equilibrium with low investment and output. Profit from low investment (X_L^*) with traditional technology exceeds profit from high investment (X_H^*) with modern technology. (b) Equilibrium during input intervention with subsidy s for modern variety seeds and inputs. Subsidized profit from modern technology now exceeds profit from traditional technology. (c) Post-intervention equilibrium when there are returns to experience. Production function with modern technology grows from $f_H(x)$ to $f'_H(x)$, and is now more profitable than traditional technology. (d) Equilibrium with output price support. An increase in the output price flattens isoprofit curves, creating the possibility that modern technology dominates traditional technology even under the existing production functions without returns to experience.

Figure 3: Randomization Design for Input and Output Experiments



Figure 4: Timeline of Activities



Figure 5: Pulse Adoption and Area Sown



Notes: Graphical representation of regression estimates reported in Table 3.

Figure 6: Seed Demand Curves



Notes: Average quantity demanded at each price in incentive-compatible elicitation of demand for coupon for certified seeds delivered by FPC.

Figure 7: Adoption Patterns by Year and Treatment Status



Notes: Fraction of farmers growing pulses by cropping practice. E denotes extension in first year; B denotes subsidy only in first year; C denotes control. In second year, both E and B received high-intensity extension.

Figure 8: Treatment Effects on Production, Profits, and Consumption Relative to Control Mean



Notes: Graphical representation of results presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 with 95% confidence intervals. Each row represents the difference between treatment and control divided by the control mean and can be interpreted as the percent change in the outcome relative to control. We present the same results in standard deviations in Appendix B.

Table 1: Baseline Characteristics by Input Experiment Treatment Status

Variable	(1) Control Mean/SE	(2) Treated Mean/SE	(3) Total Mean/SE	Difference (1)-(2)
Farm respondent:				
Male	0.868	0.840	0.850	0.028
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.012)	
Age	48.264	49.371	48.952	-1.107
	(0.884)	(0.664)	(0.531)	
Primary School	0.548	0.658	0.616	-0.109***
	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.016)	
Secondary School	0.390	0.485	0.449	-0.095***
	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.017)	
Food respondent:				
Male	0.008	0.004	0.006	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	
Age	35.627	36.142	35.947	-0.515
	(0.646)	(0.505)	(0.397)	
Primary School	0.506	0.588	0.557	-0.082
	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.029)	
Secondary School	0.391	0.461	0.434	-0.069
	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.029)	
Household:				
HH Size	7.524	6.656	6.984	0.868***
	(0.217)	(0.143)	(0.122)	
SC/ST	0.179	0.150	0.161	0.029
	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.012)	
Past Pulses	0.642	0.665	0.656	-0.023
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.016)	
Asset Index	-0.253	-0.018	-0.107	-0.235**
	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.051)	
Land Owned	1.383	1.684	1.570	-0.301**
	(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.060)	
Households	341	561	902	

Notes: Mean values of household baseline covariates with standard errors in parentheses. Wealth and land area are censored at the 95th percentile. Column 3 reports differences in means across groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 2: 2011 Village Characteristics by Output Experiment Treatment Status

Variable	(1) Control Mean/SE	(2) Subsidy Mean/SE	(3) Floor Mean/SE	Difference (1)-(2)	(1)-(3)
Num. HHs	944.500	747.889	978.467	-196.611	33.967
	(271.256)	(119.557)	(169.755)		
HH Size	6.049	5.766	5.974	-0.283	-0.076
	(0.218)	(0.166)	(0.214)		
SC/ST	0.068	0.069	0.052	0.001	-0.016
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)		
Primary School	0.440	0.400	0.465	-0.040	0.025
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.028)		
Secondary School	0.154	0.143	0.176	-0.011	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)		
Solid Roof	0.548	0.505	0.534	-0.043	-0.014
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.049)		
Frac. Landowners	0.370	0.379	0.401	0.009	0.031
	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.034)		
Land Owned	5.238	7.759	4.080	2.521	-1.158
	(1.522)	(1.962)	(0.894)		
Share Irrigated	0.663	0.745	0.728	0.082	0.065
	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.034)		
Ag. Empl. Share	0.217	0.159	0.200	-0.058*	-0.018
	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.023)		
Ag. Primary Income	0.215	0.178	0.187	-0.037	-0.028
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.022)		
Villages	49	53	50		
Matched to SECC	32	36	30		
F–test of joint significance				0.997	0.672

Notes: Mean values of village characteristics reported in 2011 Socioeconomic and Caste Census with standard errors in parentheses. Columns 4 and 5 report differences in means across groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 3: Adoption and Area Cultivated by Input Treatment Status

	Kharif		Rabi		Zaid	
	Adoption (1)	Area (2)	Adoption (3)	Area (4)	Adoption (5)	Area (6)
Treat Yr. 1	0.144***	0.043	0.206***	0.034	0.074*	0.012
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
	[0.006]	[0.122]	[0.000]	[1.000]	[0.073]	[1.000]
Treat Yr. 2	0.034	0.011	0.142**	0.006	0.061	0.010
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[0.017]	[1.000]	[0.758]	[1.000]
Treat Yr. 3	-0.037	-0.004	0.031	-0.010	0.038	0.004
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Year 2	-0.041	0.015	-0.047	0.033	0.080	0.017
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Year 3	-0.111	-0.026	-0.019	0.006	0.112	0.034
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Control Mean	0.21	0.06	0.46	0.19	0.03	0.02
R-Squared	0.21	0.10	0.18	0.12	0.09	0.08
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2004	2004

Notes: Regressions according to (1). Standard errors clustered at the village level reported in parentheses and sharpened q-values in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level after q-value adjustment.

Table 4: Seed Demand by Input Treatment Status

	Survey	Seed Quantity (Kg.)	
	Participate	Purchased	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat	0.0216	-0.174*	-0.712**
	(0.0336)	(0.105)	(0.323)
Price=60		0.824***	0.824***
		(0.0519)	(0.0519)
Price=80		0.445***	0.445***
		(0.0350)	(0.0350)
Price=100		0.245***	0.245***
		(0.0227)	(0.0227)
Price=120		0.0998***	0.0998***
		(0.0151)	(0.0151)
Control Mean	0.46	0.94	3.04
R-Squared	0.03	0.14	0.13
Observations	3244	17865	17865

Notes: Regressions according to (2). Control mean evaluated at price of Rs. 140. Standard errors clustered by village reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 5: Pulse Productivity by Input Treatment Status

	Yield (Kg./Acre)		
	Kharif	Rabi	Zaid
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treat Yr. 1	14.766	-41.347	-27.228
	(23.11)	(122.26)	(54.87)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Treat Yr. 2	-19.712	65.481	2.866
	(42.18)	(113.67)	(35.83)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Treat Yr. 3	3.433	-132.453	23.500
	(42.93)	(78.48)	(42.02)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Year 2	113.998	-123.052	-31.076
	(39.00)	(78.73)	(57.41)
Year 3	70.297	-216.638	-59.724
	(32.17)	(92.90)	(51.85)
Control Mean	64.37	466.74	140.84
R-Squared	0.11	0.04	0.20
Observations	555	1179	252

Notes: Regressions according to (1). Standard errors clustered at the village level reported in parentheses and sharpened q-values in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level after q-value adjustment.

Table 6: Pulse Production by Input Treatment Status

	Harvest Production (Kgs.)			Prod.	Harvest Stock
	Kharif	Rabi	Zaid	Index	(Months)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	1.962	16.277*	2.946	0.236	1.322*
	(1.32)	(5.77)	(1.75)	(0.08)	(0.42)
	[1.000]	[0.090]	[1.000]		[0.063]
Treat Yr. 2	1.451	1.049	1.012	0.073	-0.076
	(1.93)	(6.21)	(2.01)	(0.09)	(0.44)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]		[1.000]
Treat Yr. 3	-0.819	2.975	0.321	0.021	0.000
	(1.17)	(6.01)	(1.65)	(0.07)	(.)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]		[.]
Year 2	3.946	6.614	3.376	0.210	0.573
	(1.36)	(4.46)	(1.80)	(0.06)	(0.44)
Year 3	1.127	2.858	2.976	0.003	0.000
	(1.14)	(4.94)	(1.59)	(0.06)	(.)
Control Mean	1.55	34.08	2.03	-0.08	2.58
R-Squared	0.09	0.17	0.07	0.16	0.16
Observations	2511	2004	2004	2511	1674

Notes: Regressions according to (1). Standard errors clustered at the village level reported in parentheses and sharpened q-values in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level after q-value adjustment.

Table 7: Profits and Costs by Input Treatment Status

	Profit (1)	Revenue (2)	Sales (3)	Cost (4)	Farm Area (5)	Profit Index (6)
Treat Yr. 1	4442.594	4456.582	2230.851	2418.971	0.084	0.135
	(3317.98)	(2808.46)	(2489.41)	(3267.39)	(0.09)	(0.10)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	
Treat Yr. 2	-3379.568	6940.508	3179.382	4762.896	0.112	0.215
	(5469.39)	(4463.87)	(3530.01)	(3439.99)	(0.10)	(0.15)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	
Treat Yr. 3	948.790	-2873.859	782.103	-2511.382	0.006	-0.052
	(1993.22)	(1912.21)	(3211.86)	(1789.70)	(0.10)	(0.08)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	
Year 2	9565.310	14368.450	11726.240	-455.713	0.243	0.371
	(3858.68)	(3137.17)	(2994.30)	(2483.21)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Year 3	18586.565	-25817.847	6776.690	-33990.658	0.030	-0.674
	(3241.46)	(2538.30)	(2489.74)	(2754.74)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Control Mean	-19107.33	30179.16	13025.87	52129.79	1.38	-0.04
R-Squared	0.03	0.37	0.31	0.41	0.32	0.41
Observations	2511	2511	2004	2511	2511	2511

Notes: Regressions according to (1). Standard errors clustered at the village level reported in parentheses and sharpened q-values in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level after q-value adjustment.

Table 8: Consumption and Stocks by Input Treatment Status

	Stock Remaining		Consumption	Daily Protein (g)		Cons.
	Kgs.	Months	(Kg./Week)	HH/capita	Female	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treat Yr. 1	1.083	0.371	12.688	0.060	0.000	0.202
	(0.69)	(0.22)	(37.08)	(1.05)	(.)	(0.11)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[.]	
Treat Yr. 2	0.516	0.429	-20.832	-2.259	-11.190	0.154
	(0.84)	(0.19)	(17.73)	(2.99)	(19.08)	(0.12)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	
Treat Yr. 3	0.209	0.020	-12.837	-4.269	-5.740	0.017
	(0.42)	(0.08)	(19.15)	(4.14)	(17.81)	(0.05)
	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	
Year 2	0.792	-0.108	-130.192	5.174	-0.420	-0.018
	(0.60)	(0.19)	(27.87)	(2.58)	(23.09)	(0.09)
Year 3	-2.141	-1.278	-86.696	8.800	0.000	-0.564
	(0.56)	(0.18)	(29.90)	(3.71)	(.)	(0.09)
Control Mean	4.38	1.24	399.79	14.80	99.62	0.12
R-Squared	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.09	0.03	0.18
Observations	2511	2511	2469	2469	1629	2469

Notes: Regressions according to (1). Standard errors clustered at the village level reported in parentheses and sharpened q-values in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level after q-value adjustment.

Table 9: Cultivation and Sales by Output Treatment Status

	Kharif Season			Rabi Season		
	Area	Sown	Sold	Area	Sown	Sold
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Subsidy	-0.000196	0.0941	5.053	0.0440	0.663	112.4**
	(0.205)	(1.305)	(18.67)	(0.152)	(1.757)	(54.83)
Price Floor	0.00812	0.0388	-2.632	0.0349	0.515	29.29
	(0.179)	(1.077)	(12.81)	(0.139)	(1.683)	(36.14)
Control Mean	0.09	0.98	51.48	0.15	1.86	75.36
HH FEs	X	X		X	X	
R-Squared	0.91	0.91	0.47	0.95	0.94	0.18
Observations	3356	3356	112	10725	10725	152

Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 report regression results according to (3). Columns 3 and 6 report regression results according to(4). Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Acknowledgements and Disclosure Statement

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All data collection was approved by the University of California, Davis IRB. Primary analysis was pre-registered at the AEA RCT registry under AEARCTR-0003872 and AEARCTR-0004393.

Supplementary Appendix for "Striving to Revive Pulses"

For Online Publication Only

A Implementation Details

A.1 Survey Attrition

Table S1 reports the number of households surveyed in each round by treatment status. The first and third columns report the number of households, while the second and fourth columns report the number of households remaining in a balanced panel up to that point. Attrition is nearly identical between treatment and control, with small numbers exiting the sample in each round. The rate of attrition is substantially higher in the final Rabi survey owing to the fact that it was a phone survey conducted after the onset of COVID-19, while all other round were conducted in person.

[Table S1 about here.]

Table S2 reports household baseline characteristics by survey attrition status. The first column reports data for households that participated in all survey rounds, column 2 includes those that responded to all survey rounds but did not participate in the third-year Rabi phone survey, and column 3 presents data on those that missed at least one in-person survey. Households that did not participate in the COVID-19 phone survey tend to be wealthier and more educated, but these characteristics do not predict prior attrition.

[Table S2 about here.]

For regression analysis, we restrict to a balanced panel of households. This yields a sample of 924 households for data collected in the Kharif season and 669 households for data collected in the Rabi season. Variables that include data from the third-year Rabi phone survey include Rabi pulse production and yield, Zaid adoption and area, Zaid production and yield, and sales revenue. Other outcomes on profitability and household consumption were dropped from phone surveys for time. The year fixed effect controls for differences in response induced by survey mode in the final phone round. In Appendix B.2 we demonstrate robustness to attrition by running regressions using all households in an unbalanced panel.

Table S1: Households per Survey Round

	Control		Treatment	
	Households	Balanced Panel	Households	Balanced Panel
Year 1 Kharif	404	404 (100%)	678	678 (100%)
Year 1 Rabi	393	393 (97%)	665	665 (98%)
Year 2 Kharif	391	381 (94%)	639	628 (93%)
Year 2 Rabi	356	348 (86%)	588	579 (85%)
Year 3 Kharif	347	317 (78%)	577	523 (77%)
Year 3 Rabi	268	250 (62%)	454	419 (62%)

Number of households responding in each survey round. Balanced panel reflects number of households available in all survey rounds up to that point. Year 3 Rabi survey was conducted by phone during COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore has higher rates of attrition.

Table S2: Baseline Characteristics by Survey Attrition

Variable	(1) All Surveys Mean/SE	(2) Drop Phone Mean/SE	(3) Drop Early Mean/SE	T-test Difference (1)-(2)	(1)-(3)
Farm respondent:					
Male	0.870	0.778	0.839	0.092***	0.031
	(0.013)	(0.032)	(0.024)		
Age	49.315	48.649	46.773	0.666	2.543**
	(0.612)	(1.277)	(1.000)		
Primary School	0.661	0.468	0.600	0.193***	0.061*
	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.028)		
Secondary School	0.493	0.292	0.458	0.201***	0.035
	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.028)		
Food respondent:					
Male	0.004	0.015	0.005	-0.011*	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.004)		
Age	35.812	36.187	36.777	-0.374	-0.965
	(0.462)	(0.910)	(0.727)		
Primary School	0.570	0.568	0.618	0.002	-0.048
	(0.031)	(0.096)	(0.069)		
Secondary School	0.437	0.462	0.510	-0.024	-0.073
	(0.031)	(0.096)	(0.070)		
Household:					
HH Size	7.030	6.917	6.386	0.113	0.644**
	(0.145)	(0.266)	(0.192)		
SC/ST	0.169	0.129	0.149	0.040	0.020
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.023)		
Past Pulses	0.656	0.643	0.632	0.013	0.024
	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.031)		
Asset Index	-0.028	-0.412	0.004	0.383***	-0.032
	(0.060)	(0.117)	(0.104)		
Land Owned	1.629	1.294	1.734	0.335**	-0.105
	(0.072)	(0.119)	(0.119)		
Households	669	171	242		

Notes: Mean values of baseline covariates by attrition status. Column 1 includes households that responded to all surveys, Column 2 contains those that answered all in-person surveys but dropped out of final Rabi season phone survey, and Column 3 includes those that absent from at least one in-person survey. Wealth and land area are censored at the 95th percentile. The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

A.2 Cropping Practices by Farmer Group Membership

Among households that joined a farmer group, cropping patterns are consistent with experimentation using modern cultivation. Table S3 reports treatment effects on cropping patterns by farmer group membership. Overall, farmer group members are more likely to adopt pulses than non-members in treated villages. The distinction is most stark in the second and third project years, when non-member adoption is statistically indistinguishable from control. Adoption differences are almost exclusively in pulse mono-cropping, presented in the first and third columns of Table S3. Evidence also shows a smaller increase in pulse adoption in the frist year by treated households who do not join the farmer group, as a monocrop in the Kharif season and with both mono- and mixed cropping in the Rabi season. Note that heterogeneity by farmer group membership is non-experimental because membership is an endogenous choice whose realization is unobserved in control villages where no group is formed. Nevertheless, results support program effects being strongest among farmer group members with some spillover onto non-members.

[Table S3 about here.]

Table S3: Pulse Cropping Patterns by Farmer Group Membership

	Kharif		Rabi	
	Mono	Mixed	Mono	Mixed
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat Yr. 1	0.162***	-0.0267	0.0921*	0.107**
	(0.0474)	(0.0456)	(0.0481)	(0.0484)
Treat Y1*Farmer Group	0.0883*	0.0702	0.125***	0.0505
	(0.0468)	(0.0453)	(0.0462)	(0.0438)
Treat Yr. 2	0.0369	-0.0218	0.0369	0.0720*
	(0.0414)	(0.0293)	(0.0430)	(0.0400)
Treat Y2*Farmer Group	0.156***	-0.0543*	0.124***	-0.0119
	(0.0459)	(0.0279)	(0.0443)	(0.0366)
Treat Yr. 3	-0.0776**	-0.0151	-0.0390	-0.00749
	(0.0328)	(0.0178)	(0.0403)	(0.0349)
Treat Y3*Farmer Group	0.104***	-0.00869	0.0699*	0.0436
	(0.0345)	(0.0236)	(0.0380)	(0.0308)
Year 2	0.0153	-0.122***	0.0706*	-0.188***
	(0.0446)	(0.0279)	(0.0389)	(0.0345)
Year 3	-0.0262	-0.177***	0.0655*	-0.149***
	(0.0413)	(0.0338)	(0.0380)	(0.0342)
Control Mean	0.115	0.202	0.245	0.312
R-Squared	0.211	0.155	0.127	0.129
Observations	1625	1625	2255	2255

Notes: Regressions following (1) with treatment effects broken down by farmer group membership. Standard errors clustered by village reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

A.3 Principal Components Analysis of Outcomes

Table S4 reports results from principal components analysis used for construction of production, profitability, and consumption indices, respectively. The first panel reports loading factors on each season of production as presented in Table 6. Months of household pulse stock is excluded because it is not measured in the third year. Only the first principal component has an associated eigenvector greater than one, although the high unexplained variation in production outcomes indicates that pulse production is relatively uncorrelated across seasons within a farmer-year.

[Table S4 about here.]

The second panel of Table S4 reports loading factors on variables related to profitability as presented in Table 7. Net profit is excluded because it is already a linear combination of production revenue and production cost. Only the first principal component is associated with an eigenvector greater than one. The large difference between the first and second eigenvalue as well as the relatively low unexplained variation in variables indicates that profitability measures are fairly well correlated.

The final panel of Table S4 reports loading factors on variables related to consumption as presented in Table 8. Daily protein consumption of the (predominantly female) household food preparer is excluded because data was not collected in the first year. Both the first and second components are associated with eigenvalues greater than one, while the third and fourth are associated with eigenvalues less than one. The first component places positive weight on all variables, but the unexplained variation indicates that it is most strongly associated with household pulse stocks.

The second principal component of consumption picks up most of the remaining variation in pulse and protein consumption. It places a slight negative weight on household stock variables, and larger positive weight on consumption outcomes. The first two components together explain 57.9% and 60.8% of per capita pulse and protein consumption, respectively.

Regression estimation using the second principal component of consumption is consistent with the null results presented in Table 8. The estimated treatment effects in years 1, 2, and 3 are negative and quantitatively small at -0.004, -0.11, and -0.11, respectively, and all three coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level.

Table S4: Principal Components Analysis Details

	Production	
	Loading	Unexplained
Kharif Production	0.484	0.734
Rabi Production	0.614	0.533
Zaid Production	0.595	0.598
First Eigenvalue	1.135	
Second Eigenvalue	0.962	
	Profitability	
	Loading	Unexplained
Production Revenue	0.529	0.210
Sales Revenue	0.486	0.334
Production Cost	0.528	0.213
Area Farmed	0.452	0.424
First Eigenvalue	2.819	
Second Eigenvalue	0.579	
	Consumption	
	Loading	Unexplained
Household Stock (Kgs.)	0.698	0.215
Household Stock (Months)	0.695	0.223
Pulse Consumption	0.170	0.953
Protein Consumption	0.037	0.998
First Eigenvalue	1.611	
Second Eigenvalue	1.162	

A.4 Output Subsidy Calibration

Price floors offered by FPCs in the third experiment year matched the national MSP, which was set at Rs.56/kg. for black gram and Rs. 44.75/kg. for lentils in the year of study. We calibrate the per-unit subsidy to match the average MSP premium over the market wholesale price at harvest in the prior ten years, with zero premium when the market price exceeded the MSP. Historical price data from Bihar was unavailable for this exercise, so we use inflation-adjusted market prices in the neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh reported by the Indian Ministry of Agriculture. For this calculation, we use the October market price for black gram and the March price for lentils. The black gram MSP exceeded the inflation-adjusted market price in 2009, 2011, 2017, and 2018, with an average premium of Rs. 5.88, so the black gram subsidy was set at Rs. 6. The lentil MSP exceeded the inflation-adjusted market price in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2018, with an average premium of Rs. 1.72, so the lentil subsidy was set at Rs. 2. Full price details are provided in Table S5.

[Table S5 about here.]

Table S5: Market Prices and Implicit MSP Subsidies by Year

	Black Gram (MSP = Rs. 56/kg.)		Lentil (MSP = Rs. 44.75/kg.)	
	Market Price	Subsidy	Market Price	Subsidy
2009	40.72	15.28	52.29	0
2010	68.08	0	54.58	0
2011	49.95	6.05	42.55	2.20
2012	56.48	0	38.98	5.77
2013	61.44	0	44.33	0.42
2014	62.41	0	48.10	0
2015	97.39	0	54.70	0
2016	65.75	0	58.48	0
2017	33.52	20.48	52.46	0
2018	39.01	16.99	35.96	8.79
Average		5.88		1.72

Notes: Inflation-adjusted market prices from Uttar Pradesh as reported by the Ministry of Agriculture, and the level of implicit subsidy that would have been issued under the current MSP. Black gram uses the October price; lentil uses the March price.

B Robustness

Figure S1 reports standardized treatment effects on pulse production by season, profitability outcomes, and consumption outcomes. Each row reports the difference in mean between treatment and control divided by the variable standard deviation, as a counterpart to Figure 8 that divides by the control mean.

[Figure S1 about here.]

In the rest of this section we verify that results presented in Tables 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are robust to ignoring attrition and conducting analysis with an unbalanced panel of households, to omitting household controls, and to dropping data from the Samastipur district where farmer group membership was the lowest. We also present results broken down by first-year treatment status, differentiating between farmers that received subsidies alone and those that received subsidies with high-intensity extension in the first year.

Figure S1: Standardized Treatment Effects on Production, Profits, and Consumption



Notes: Graphical representation of results presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 with 95% confidence intervals. Each row represents the difference between treatment and control divided by the standard deviation. We present the same results relative to the control mean in Figure 8.

B.1 Robustness to Imbalance at Baseline

Table 1 reveals ex post imbalance between sample farmers assigned to treatment and control in the primary evaluation after randomization. Specifically, treated farmers appear to wealthier, more educated, and live in smaller households. The main regression specification includes all baseline covariates as controls. Figures S2–S6 report results on survey outcomes using alternate ex post methods of addressing imbalance. The first row of black crosses reproduces the main specification with baseline controls. The second row of blue circles reports results using the double post lasso method of covariate selection following Belloni et al. (2013). The covariate pool includes all baseline characteristics interacted with year-specific dummies. The third row of red diamonds reports weighted regression coefficients using weights for entropy balancing following Hainmueller (2012). For comparison, the fourth row of light green triangles reports raw treatment–control differences with only year and block fixed effects.

We cannot reject equality between coefficients across all four categories of estimation, and estimated treatment effects are qualitatively similar regardless of the method of controlling for imbalance. The largest discrepancies appear when omitting controls entirely in regressions involving profits and consumption. These discrepancies are to be expected because wealthier and more educated households are likely to enjoy higher earnings and consumption regardless of treatment status. Nevertheless, all three methods of controlled regression produce consistent results.

[Figure S2 about here.]

[Figure S3 about here.]

[Figure S4 about here.]

[Figure S5 about here.]

[Figure S6 about here.]

Figure S2: Results on Adoption and Area Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 3 under alternate methods of adjusting for baseline imbalance. First row reproduces main specification with full controls as prespecificed. Second row uses double lasso method of Belloni et al. (2013) with baseline covariates interacted with year dummies as covariate pool. Third row uses entropy balancing method of Hainmueller (2012). Fourth row presents raw treatment–control difference with no controls.

Figure S3: Results on Yield Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 5 under alternate methods of adjusting for baseline imbalance. First row reproduces main specification with full controls as prespecificed. Second row uses double lasso method of Belloni et al. (2013) with baseline covariates interacted with year dummies as covariate pool. Third row uses entropy balancing method of Hainmueller (2012). Fourth row presents raw treatment–control difference with no controls.

Figure S4: Results on Production Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 6 under alternate methods of adjusting for baseline imbalance. First row reproduces main specification with full controls as prespecificed. Second row uses double lasso method of Belloni et al. (2013) with baseline covariates interacted with year dummies as covariate pool. Third row uses entropy balancing method of Hainmueller (2012). Fourth row presents raw treatment–control difference with no controls.

Figure S5: Results on Profitability Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 7 under alternate methods of adjusting for baseline imbalance. First row reproduces main specification with full controls as prespecificed. Second row uses double lasso method of Belloni et al. (2013) with baseline covariates interacted with year dummies as covariate pool. Third row uses entropy balancing method of Hainmueller (2012). Fourth row presents raw treatment–control difference with no controls.

Figure S6: Results on Consumption Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 8 under alternate methods of adjusting for baseline imbalance. First row reproduces main specification with full controls as prespecificed. Second row uses double lasso method of Belloni et al. (2013) with baseline covariates interacted with year dummies as covariate pool. Third row uses entropy balancing method of Hainmueller (2012). Fourth row presents raw treatment–control difference with no controls.

B.2 Robustness within Subsamples of Interest

The main analysis presents intention-to-treat (ITT) effects on a sample of households drawn from those attending the initial kickoff project kickoff meetings. The Figures S7–S11 verify the robustness of our main results from the primary evaluation to a number of alternate specifications. Each figure corresponds to a table of regression results. The top row of black crosses represents our main estiamte.

First, among study districts, Samastipur had the lowest rate of subsequent farmer group membership among this sample in treated villages at 31%, well below the project average of 54%. Since farmer group enrollment reflects underlying receptiveness to pulse activities, measured effects are likely to be the weakest in this district. The second row of blue circles in each figure reproduces results dropping Samastipur from analysis.

Second, within treated villages, the level of extension varied in the first year. A third of villages received the full support package with input subsidies and extension support, while the other two thirds received subsidized inputs with none or minimal extension. The third and fourth rows of red diamonds and light green triangles in each figure break down treatment effects between those receiving first-year intensive extension and first-year subsidy only, respectively.

Finally, the main analysis drops households that do not participate in every survey round to restrict to a balanced panel. The fifth row of each figure with brown squares presents results using all respondents regardless of their participation in other survey rounds.

[Figure S7 about here.]

[Figure S8 about here.]

[Figure S9 about here.]

[Figure S10 about here.]

[Figure S11 about here.]

Figure S7: Results on Adoption and Area Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 3 under alternate specifications. First row reproduces main specification. Second row drops Samastipur district from analysis. Third row estimates treatment effect in villages receiving subsidy and intensive extension in first year. Fourth row estimates treatment effects in villages receiving none or minimal extension in first year. Fifth row does not restrict to balanced panel.

Figure S8: Results on Yield Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 5 under alternate specifications. First row reproduces main specification. Second row drops Samastipur district from analysis. Third row estimates treatment effect in villages receiving subsidy and intensive extension in first year. Fourth row estimates treatment effects in villages receiving none or minimal extension in first year. Fifth row does not restrict to balanced panel.

Figure S9: Results on Production Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 6 under alternate specifications. First row reproduces main specification. Second row drops Samastipur district from analysis. Third row estimates treatment effect in villages receiving subsidy and intensive extension in first year. Fourth row estimates treatment effects in villages receiving none or minimal extension in first year. Fifth row does not restrict to balanced panel.

Figure S10: Results on Profitability Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 7 under alternate specifications. First row reproduces main specification. Second row drops Samastipur district from analysis. Third row estimates treatment effect in villages receiving subsidy and intensive extension in first year. Fourth row estimates treatment effects in villages receiving none or minimal extension in first year. Fifth row does not restrict to balanced panel.

Figure S11: Results on Consumption Under Alternate Specifications



Notes: This table reproduces point estimates and 95% confidence intervals form Table 8 under alternate specifications. First row reproduces main specification. Second row drops Samastipur district from analysis. Third row estimates treatment effect in villages receiving subsidy and intensive extension in first year. Fourth row estimates treatment effects in villages receiving none or minimal extension in first year. Fifth row does not restrict to balanced panel.

C Heterogeneity

In this section, we explore heterogeneity in treatment effects for every survey outcome in our analysis. Formally we run the regression

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{\tau} \beta_\tau T_i \times \mathbf{1}\{t = \tau\} + \sigma_\tau T_i \times \mathbf{1}\{t = \tau\} \times \mathbf{1}\{I_i = 1\} + \alpha_t + \phi_t \times \mathbf{1}\{I_i = 1\} + \gamma_{b(i)} + X_i'\delta + \epsilon_{it} \tag{5}$$

for some characteristic represented by the dummy variable I. We examine heterogeneity by membership in the pulse farmer group for treated households, by prior experience growing pulses, by above/below median asset ownership, and by above/below median land ownership. These dimensions were selected for secondary analysis according to the registered preanalysis plan prior to data collection.

[Table S6 about here.]

[Table S7 about here.]

[Table S8 about here.]

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[Table S31 about here.]

Table S6: Heterogeneity Analysis: Kharif Pulse Adoption

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.144***	0.0954**	0.115***	0.117***	0.169***
	(0.0379)	(0.0444)	(0.0369)	(0.0402)	(0.0458)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.0914**	0.0390	0.0559	-0.0572
		(0.0433)	(0.0573)	(0.0598)	(0.0679)
Treat Yr. 2	0.0340	-0.0105	-0.0115	0.0208	0.0229
	(0.0355)	(0.0378)	(0.0393)	(0.0373)	(0.0374)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.0830**	0.0713	0.0302	0.0229
		(0.0391)	(0.0505)	(0.0592)	(0.0525)
Treat Yr. 3	-0.0365	-0.0627**	0.00665	-0.0458	-0.0359
	(0.0260)	(0.0274)	(0.0273)	(0.0311)	(0.0328)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		0.0494	-0.0617	0.0231	0.00453
		(0.0304)	(0.0448)	(0.0453)	(0.0449)
$I = 1$		0	0.206***	0.0485	0.0647
		(.)	(0.0451)	(0.0465)	(0.0518)
Year 2	-0.0411	-0.0411	0.0339	-0.0123	-0.00571
	(0.0332)	(0.0332)	(0.0300)	(0.0338)	(0.0404)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	-0.120**	-0.0596	-0.0794
		(.)	(0.0465)	(0.0476)	(0.0558)
Year 3	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.0424*	-0.0736**	-0.0629
	(0.0363)	(0.0363)	(0.0249)	(0.0333)	(0.0425)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-0.109**	-0.0767*	-0.107*
		(.)	(0.0519)	(0.0439)	(0.0629)
Control Mean	0.21	0.21	0.06	0.16	0.15
R-Squared	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 3 Column 1 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S7: Heterogeneity Analysis: Kharif Pulse Area

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.0427***	0.0204	0.00588	0.00437	0.0165
	(0.0163)	(0.0193)	(0.0136)	(0.0168)	(0.0170)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.0416*	0.0557*	0.0783***	0.0500*
		(0.0211)	(0.0284)	(0.0288)	(0.0292)
Treat Yr. 2	0.0107	-0.0301	-0.00912	-0.00160	0.0254
	(0.0244)	(0.0184)	(0.0137)	(0.0152)	(0.0394)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.0757**	0.0298	0.0250	-0.0287
		(0.0323)	(0.0382)	(0.0537)	(0.0498)
Treat Yr. 3	-0.00395	-0.00492	-0.00189	-0.00674	-0.00974
	(0.0125)	(0.0142)	(0.0112)	(0.0143)	(0.0135)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		0.00240	-0.000615	0.00801	0.0154
		(0.0138)	(0.0197)	(0.0237)	(0.0218)
$I = 1$		0	0.0316*	-0.0292	0.00394
		(.)	(0.0184)	(0.0238)	(0.0179)
Year 2	0.0152	0.0152	0.00999	-0.00508	0.0145
	(0.0171)	(0.0171)	(0.0115)	(0.0140)	(0.0240)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.00829	0.0419	0.00156
		(.)	(0.0283)	(0.0348)	(0.0348)
Year 3	-0.0257**	-0.0257**	-0.00929	-0.0248**	-0.0114
	(0.0123)	(0.0124)	(0.00661)	(0.0125)	(0.0155)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-0.0262	-0.00185	-0.0320
		(.)	(0.0199)	(0.0204)	(0.0227)
Control Mean	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.03
R-Squared	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 3 Column 2 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S8: Heterogeneity Analysis: Rabi Pulse Adoption

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.206***	0.141***	0.236***	0.194***	0.197***
	(0.0415)	(0.0489)	(0.0563)	(0.0526)	(0.0495)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.121***	-0.0510	0.0250	0.00341
		(0.0412)	(0.0640)	(0.0696)	(0.0679)
Treat Yr. 2	0.142***	0.0707	0.170***	0.139***	0.0993**
	(0.0416)	(0.0456)	(0.0579)	(0.0524)	(0.0479)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.133***	-0.0391	0.00811	0.0854
		(0.0428)	(0.0679)	(0.0604)	(0.0621)
Treat Yr. 3	0.0310	-0.0250	0.0162	0.00380	0.0473
	(0.0383)	(0.0413)	(0.0577)	(0.0507)	(0.0456)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		0.105***	0.0228	0.0607	-0.0371
		(0.0366)	(0.0720)	(0.0654)	(0.0703)
$I = 1$		0	0.264***	0.0678	0.146***
		(.)	(0.0472)	(0.0625)	(0.0545)
Year 2	-0.0475	-0.0475	0.0424	-0.0307	0.00571
	(0.0345)	(0.0345)	(0.0396)	(0.0439)	(0.0465)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	-0.143***	-0.0347	-0.119*
		(.)	(0.0531)	(0.0647)	(0.0640)
Year 3	-0.0190	-0.0190	0.0508	0.0429	0.00571
	(0.0370)	(0.0370)	(0.0561)	(0.0526)	(0.0428)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-0.111*	-0.128*	-0.0554
		(.)	(0.0667)	(0.0693)	(0.0679)
Control Mean	0.46	0.46	0.24	0.38	0.36
R-Squared	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.19
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 3 Column 3 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S9: Heterogeneity Analysis: Rabi Pulse Area

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.0338	0.00879	-0.0194	0.0362	0.0560*
	(0.0522)	(0.0511)	(0.0996)	(0.0470)	(0.0318)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.0465	0.0842	-0.0116	-0.0585
		(0.0292)	(0.0909)	(0.0541)	(0.0830)
Treat Yr. 2	0.00584	0.000603	-0.0421	0.0324	-0.0149
	(0.0501)	(0.0535)	(0.0969)	(0.0502)	(0.0394)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.0101	0.0761	-0.0591	0.0338
		(0.0450)	(0.0977)	(0.0645)	(0.0949)
Treat Yr. 3	-0.00988	-0.0257	0.0429	0.0186	0.00628
	(0.0317)	(0.0314)	(0.0317)	(0.0366)	(0.0278)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		0.0296	-0.0849	-0.0614	-0.0380
		(0.0306)	(0.0544)	(0.0660)	(0.0646)
$I = 1$		0	-0.00932	-0.00905	0.165*
		(.)	(0.0809)	(0.0546)	(0.0968)
Year 2	0.0327	0.0327	0.0312	0.0375	0.0637*
	(0.0283)	(0.0283)	(0.0238)	(0.0355)	(0.0380)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.00234	-0.0100	-0.0695
		(.)	(0.0466)	(0.0503)	(0.0552)
Year 3	0.00568	0.00568	-0.0980	0.0266	0.0339
	(0.0495)	(0.0495)	(0.0958)	(0.0419)	(0.0242)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	0.166*	-0.0433	-0.0633
		(.)	(0.0975)	(0.0630)	(0.0971)
Control Mean	0.19	0.19	0.15	0.12	0.09
R-Squared	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 3 Column 4 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S10: Heterogeneity Analysis: Zaid Pulse Adoption

		Interaction ($I=1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.0739***	0.0462*	0.0649*	0.0943***	0.0706**
	(0.0257)	(0.0270)	(0.0329)	(0.0249)	(0.0306)
Treat Y1*($I=1$)		0.0503*	0.0146	-0.0364	0.0117
		(0.0281)	(0.0376)	(0.0426)	(0.0431)
Treat Yr. 2	0.0609*	0.00405	0.0473	0.0769*	0.0617
	(0.0337)	(0.0366)	(0.0533)	(0.0426)	(0.0381)
Treat Y2*($I=1$)		0.103***	0.0218	-0.0288	-0.00666
		(0.0324)	(0.0544)	(0.0556)	(0.0515)
Treat Yr. 3	0.0385	0.0423	0.0189	0.00725	0.0292
	(0.0336)	(0.0399)	(0.0544)	(0.0378)	(0.0335)
Treat Y3*($I=1$)		-0.00635	0.0292	0.0612	0.00783
		(0.0383)	(0.0616)	(0.0511)	(0.0581)
$I=1$		0	0.00886	0.0283	-0.0151
		(.)	(0.0222)	(0.0387)	(0.0291)
Year 2	0.0800***	0.0800***	0.0842***	0.0738***	0.0511
	(0.0264)	(0.0264)	(0.0306)	(0.0277)	(0.0339)
Y2*($I=1$)		0	-0.00679	0.0122	0.0639
		(.)	(0.0386)	(0.0413)	(0.0449)
Year 3	0.112***	0.112***	0.105**	0.123***	0.0730**
	(0.0318)	(0.0319)	(0.0450)	(0.0336)	(0.0315)
Y3*($I=1$)		0	0.0109	-0.0214	0.0863*
		(.)	(0.0515)	(0.0517)	(0.0502)
Control Mean	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.03
R-Squared	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.10
Observations	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 3 Column 5 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S11: Heterogeneity Analysis: Zaid Pulse Area

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.0119	0.00740	0.0267*	0.0254***	-0.000163
	(0.0180)	(0.0165)	(0.0150)	(0.00972)	(0.0224)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.00803	-0.0222	-0.0270	0.0289
		(0.0184)	(0.0311)	(0.0329)	(0.0383)
Treat Yr. 2	0.00982	0.00427	0.00210	0.00979	0.0164
	(0.0152)	(0.0161)	(0.0142)	(0.0153)	(0.0144)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.00993	0.0112	-0.000720	-0.0144
		(0.0181)	(0.0266)	(0.0295)	(0.0316)
Treat Yr. 3	0.00416	0.0180	0.00209	0.0196	0.0148
	(0.0183)	(0.0234)	(0.0218)	(0.0164)	(0.0117)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-0.0249	0.00317	-0.0311	-0.0268
		(0.0256)	(0.0317)	(0.0283)	(0.0356)
$I = 1$		0	0.0278	0.00350	-0.0376
		(.)	(0.0236)	(0.0366)	(0.0347)
Year 2	0.0168	0.0168	0.0173*	0.0271**	-0.00732
	(0.0192)	(0.0192)	(0.00884)	(0.0118)	(0.0254)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	-0.000765	-0.0201	0.0534
		(.)	(0.0303)	(0.0363)	(0.0364)
Year 3	0.0339	0.0339	0.0369**	0.0268***	-0.00320
	(0.0208)	(0.0209)	(0.0159)	(0.00879)	(0.0237)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-0.00484	0.0140	0.0821**
		(.)	(0.0349)	(0.0390)	(0.0405)
Control Mean	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02
R-Squared	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 3 Column 6 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S12: Heterogeneity Analysis: Kharif Pulse Yield

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	14.77	29.34	42.38	-2.799	7.903
	(23.11)	(26.46)	(42.82)	(28.66)	(31.98)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		-23.09	-33.15	35.81	13.05
		(21.96)	(44.36)	(39.47)	(49.35)
Treat Yr. 2	-19.71	7.942	-38.90	-4.448	-51.29
	(42.18)	(56.58)	(57.71)	(59.04)	(64.50)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		-42.88	23.58	-16.97	63.94
		(45.91)	(84.83)	(85.45)	(87.56)
Treat Yr. 3	3.433	-34.92	32.16	-27.59	-125.8*
	(42.93)	(48.87)	(32.26)	(65.96)	(68.03)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		56.34	-22.95	56.27	250.1**
		(53.74)	(60.72)	(102.1)	(98.35)
$I = 1$		0	50.17	35.31	19.96
		(.)	(40.88)	(35.08)	(44.79)
Year 2	114.0***	114.3***	121.1**	109.7***	142.6**
	(39.00)	(39.26)	(60.42)	(38.88)	(57.24)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	-9.008	5.866	-58.13
		(.)	(80.91)	(58.92)	(76.59)
Year 3	70.30**	70.46**	-8.993	91.09	146.2**
	(32.17)	(32.13)	(46.27)	(65.68)	(60.62)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	84.55	-35.31	-161.4**
		(.)	(56.26)	(85.98)	(81.25)
Control Mean	64.37	64.37	57.75	66.99	44.36
R-Squared	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12
Observations	555	555	555	555	555

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 5 Column 1 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S13: Heterogeneity Analysis: Rabi Pulse Yield

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	-41.35	145.5	-321.8	-15.95	83.95
	(122.3)	(241.8)	(254.2)	(255.8)	(263.5)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		-311.1	362.9	-50.87	-219.0
		(276.8)	(299.6)	(306.6)	(339.0)
Treat Yr. 2	65.48	92.41	480.3	9.144	196.2
	(113.7)	(131.6)	(354.5)	(218.0)	(246.1)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		-55.66	-570.2	95.53	-207.1
		(214.8)	(371.8)	(239.5)	(271.2)
Treat Yr. 3	-132.5*	-144.3*	-265.3	-47.52	-216.1*
	(78.48)	(76.89)	(169.5)	(73.49)	(118.4)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		13.34	176.2	-187.9	136.1
		(66.56)	(178.2)	(140.0)	(138.6)
$I = 1$		0	-110.9	-74.23	4.818
		(.)	(255.6)	(176.2)	(161.8)
Year 2	-123.1	-119.4	-355.2	-47.76	-51.48
	(78.73)	(79.66)	(250.1)	(165.9)	(116.6)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	311.7	-137.1	-138.6
		(.)	(278.5)	(195.9)	(158.1)
Year 3	-216.6**	-215.9**	-177.7	-372.4**	-125.9
	(92.90)	(93.33)	(297.6)	(149.9)	(155.6)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-58.94	310.4	-159.0
		(.)	(303.6)	(189.0)	(222.9)
Control Mean	466.74	466.74	530.91	512.99	458.17
R-Squared	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Observations	1179	1179	1179	1179	1179

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 5 Column 2 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S14: Heterogeneity Analysis: Zaid Pulse Yield

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	-27.23	-77.47	-77.80	-33.35	17.29
	(54.87)	(72.61)	(96.78)	(96.06)	(85.34)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		76.52	58.75	-15.78	-55.30
		(72.19)	(101.5)	(83.83)	(84.67)
Treat Yr. 2	2.866	-29.94	1.338	-72.76	-52.06
	(35.83)	(38.02)	(61.14)	(47.79)	(59.33)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		41.48	-1.129	113.0*	83.93
		(44.91)	(76.40)	(60.93)	(73.00)
Treat Yr. 3	23.50	81.61	187.0	-35.72	5.711
	(42.02)	(63.95)	(171.1)	(58.67)	(55.18)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-112.4	-229.9	89.12	23.75
		(71.04)	(202.4)	(96.60)	(80.78)
$I = 1$		0	-78.80	-46.35	-58.78
		(.)	(88.01)	(80.41)	(68.82)
Year 2	-31.08	-29.56	-69.30	-32.55	-39.42
	(57.41)	(58.46)	(95.04)	(90.40)	(75.12)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	48.77	-19.14	15.36
		(.)	(86.41)	(64.71)	(67.12)
Year 3	-59.72	-56.97	-114.5	-78.07	-99.89
	(51.85)	(52.94)	(85.07)	(62.99)	(71.34)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	76.83	0	65.80
		(.)	(98.20)	(.)	(81.48)
Control Mean	140.84	140.84	190.00	360.00	149.17
R-Squared	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21
Observations	252	252	252	252	252

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 5 Column 3 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S15: Heterogeneity Analysis: Kharif Pulse Production

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	1.962	1.978	-0.450	-0.183	0.139
	(1.321)	(1.458)	(1.104)	(1.223)	(1.050)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		-0.0121	3.846*	4.547**	3.709*
		(1.832)	(2.079)	(2.129)	(2.190)
Treat Yr. 2	1.451	0.505	-0.379	0.894	0.256
	(1.926)	(1.919)	(1.300)	(1.426)	(1.723)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		1.759	2.686	1.242	2.331
		(2.289)	(2.913)	(4.038)	(3.695)
Treat Yr. 3	-0.819	-1.661	-1.112	-1.782	-2.970**
	(1.175)	(1.226)	(0.876)	(1.245)	(1.331)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		1.568	0.528	2.214	4.728*
		(1.678)	(1.982)	(2.483)	(2.480)
$I = 1$		0	-0.661	-1.041	-0.580
		(.)	(1.140)	(1.443)	(1.310)
Year 2	3.946***	3.946***	1.127	2.055**	3.411**
	(1.356)	(1.357)	(0.785)	(0.969)	(1.483)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	4.499***	3.906	1.199
		(.)	(1.671)	(2.729)	(2.927)
Year 3	1.127	1.127	-0.373*	1.227	2.349*
	(1.140)	(1.141)	(0.206)	(1.089)	(1.269)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	2.393	-0.207	-2.739
		(.)	(1.807)	(2.055)	(2.286)
Control Mean	1.55	1.55	0.31	1.10	0.73
R-Squared	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 6 Column 1 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S16: Heterogeneity Analysis: Rabi Pulse Production

	Main Result (1)	Interaction ($I = 1$) Farmer Group Member (2)	Grew Pulses Pre-Study (3)	Above Median Asset Index (4)	Above Median Land Owned (5)
Treat Yr. 1	16.28***	10.68*	16.55***	12.55**	13.03**
	(5.769)	(6.275)	(6.069)	(5.763)	(5.081)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		10.16*	-0.506	6.753	3.397
		(5.634)	(8.768)	(9.392)	(9.891)
Treat Yr. 2	1.049	-4.994	11.23	-0.270	1.370
	(6.214)	(6.672)	(7.721)	(7.147)	(5.834)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		10.96*	-15.63	2.348	-1.372
		(5.720)	(10.28)	(10.11)	(10.65)
Treat Yr. 3	2.975	-4.168	7.113	0.332	5.309
	(6.014)	(6.361)	(7.491)	(7.666)	(5.335)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		12.94**	-6.540	5.141	-5.523
		(5.464)	(9.925)	(10.91)	(10.31)
$I = 1$		0	15.72**	-1.336	22.16***
		(.)	(6.933)	(8.641)	(7.556)
Year 2	6.614	6.614	2.947	7.992	11.27**
	(4.463)	(4.466)	(5.213)	(5.114)	(5.121)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	5.914	-2.691	-10.31
		(.)	(7.378)	(8.131)	(8.486)
Year 3	2.858	2.858	0.453	8.180	6.303
	(4.936)	(4.940)	(5.618)	(6.392)	(4.400)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	3.880	-10.40	-7.622
		(.)	(7.363)	(9.272)	(10.11)
Control Mean	34.08	34.08	15.81	22.86	18.78
R-Squared	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19
Observations	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 6 Column 2 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S17: Heterogeneity Analysis: Zaid Pulse Production

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	2.946*	3.090	3.425	3.831**	1.707
	(1.748)	(1.885)	(2.160)	(1.529)	(2.122)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		-0.253	-0.732	-1.585	2.911
		(2.178)	(3.255)	(3.158)	(3.810)
Treat Yr. 2	1.012	-0.741	0.547	0.246	1.289
	(2.008)	(1.938)	(2.490)	(1.901)	(2.056)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		3.149	0.613	1.540	-0.987
		(2.150)	(3.844)	(4.105)	(4.218)
Treat Yr. 3	0.321	1.168	0.771	1.826	2.131
	(1.646)	(1.946)	(2.680)	(1.590)	(1.414)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-1.513	-0.600	-2.782	-4.110
		(1.921)	(3.250)	(3.149)	(3.395)
$I = 1$		0	0.837	1.819	-3.059
		(.)	(1.915)	(2.680)	(2.593)
Year 2	3.376*	3.376*	3.011	3.730**	0.423
	(1.801)	(1.802)	(1.907)	(1.617)	(2.408)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.589	-0.690	6.533*
		(.)	(3.080)	(3.390)	(3.399)
Year 3	2.976*	2.976*	3.632*	2.508**	-0.803
	(1.590)	(1.591)	(2.026)	(1.176)	(1.554)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-1.057	0.914	8.360***
		(.)	(2.959)	(3.093)	(2.927)
Control Mean	2.03	2.03	0.63	0.19	1.52
R-Squared	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08
Observations	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 6 Column 3 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S18: Heterogeneity Analysis: Production Index

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result (1)	Farmer Group Member (2)	Grew Pulses Pre-Study (3)	Above Median Asset Index (4)	Above Median Land Owned (5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.236***	0.191**	0.207**	0.142*	0.143**
	(0.0756)	(0.0736)	(0.0820)	(0.0727)	(0.0690)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.0864	0.0438	0.194	0.169
		(0.0770)	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.135)
Treat Yr. 2	0.0725	-0.0300	0.113	0.0781	0.0754
	(0.0885)	(0.0907)	(0.109)	(0.0924)	(0.0829)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.191**	-0.0666	-0.00868	-0.0265
		(0.0922)	(0.154)	(0.183)	(0.169)
Treat Yr. 3	0.0214	-0.0525	0.0551	0.0203	0.0221
	(0.0711)	(0.0781)	(0.0774)	(0.0811)	(0.0704)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		0.138	-0.0472	0.0118	-0.00590
		(0.0836)	(0.112)	(0.137)	(0.141)
$I = 1$		0	0.227***	-0.0134	0.187**
		(.)	(0.0727)	(0.103)	(0.0926)
Year 2	0.210***	0.210***	0.148**	0.151***	0.174**
	(0.0564)	(0.0564)	(0.0610)	(0.0491)	(0.0752)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.1000	0.123	0.0811
		(.)	(0.0943)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Year 3	0.00274	0.00274	0.0321	0.0299	0.0183
	(0.0610)	(0.0610)	(0.0613)	(0.0706)	(0.0582)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-0.0468	-0.0560	-0.0349
		(.)	(0.0926)	(0.108)	(0.121)
Control Mean					
R-Squared	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 6 Column 4 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S19: Heterogeneity Analysis: Months with Pulses

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	1.322***	0.950**	1.538***	1.702***	1.807***
	(0.418)	(0.456)	(0.526)	(0.452)	(0.494)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.700*	-0.344	-0.757	-1.093
		(0.381)	(0.611)	(0.679)	(0.664)
Treat Yr. 2	-0.0762	-0.837	0.520	0.237	0.391
	(0.441)	(0.523)	(0.470)	(0.478)	(0.472)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		1.416***	-0.922	-0.629	-1.063
		(0.538)	(0.667)	(0.691)	(0.771)
Treat Yr. 3	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		0	0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
$I = 1$		0	1.593***	0.576	1.442***
		(.)	(0.447)	(0.528)	(0.543)
Year 2	0.573	0.573	0.466	0.515	0.560
	(0.436)	(0.436)	(0.414)	(0.482)	(0.519)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.170	0.119	0.0287
		(.)	(0.706)	(0.699)	(0.829)
Year 3	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Control Mean	2.58	2.58	0.99	1.78	1.58
R-Squared	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Observations	1674	1674	1674	1674	1674

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 6 Column 5 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S20: Heterogeneity Analysis: Agricultural Profit

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	4442.6	5346.3	5952.9	2031.5	3199.6
	(3318.0)	(3402.5)	(3860.2)	(2719.5)	(3278.8)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		-1592.2	-1952.5	4555.2	3006.4
		(3000.4)	(5166.0)	(4805.1)	(5701.5)
Treat Yr. 2	-3379.6	-12476.7	-9038.3	-3453.6	-9522.9
	(5469.4)	(11196.1)	(14145.7)	(3343.3)	(10102.5)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		16819.2	8375.7	-155.8	11715.0
		(12182.0)	(15508.2)	(12006.0)	(12974.1)
Treat Yr. 3	948.8	1738.0	841.4	552.0	1800.7
	(1993.2)	(2139.4)	(2574.3)	(2006.1)	(2247.2)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-1381.4	201.6	433.8	-1708.1
		(1267.9)	(2100.1)	(2019.3)	(2172.0)
$I = 1$		0	-2446.0	-6801.9	-1985.7
		(.)	(4074.7)	(4817.6)	(5119.9)
Year 2	9565.3**	9565.3**	5938.7	8601.5***	7329.8*
	(3858.7)	(3861.0)	(3913.4)	(2439.3)	(3804.2)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	5787.8	1990.6	5010.2
		(.)	(5804.2)	(5868.6)	(6910.5)
Year 3	18586.6***	18586.6***	16057.8***	17031.0***	16430.3***
	(3241.5)	(3243.4)	(2974.0)	(2598.5)	(3377.0)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	4035.8	3212.7	4832.5
		(.)	(4226.4)	(4196.5)	(5222.4)
Control Mean	-19107.33	-19107.33	-17021.84	-17893.28	-17100.66
R-Squared	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 7 Column 1 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S21: Heterogeneity Analysis: Agricultural Production Revenue

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	4456.6	1086.1	3432.0	-1290.0	337.6
	(2808.5)	(3286.2)	(3096.4)	(2536.1)	(2799.6)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		6272.4**	1343.8	11290.7**	6771.1
		(3030.4)	(4347.5)	(4415.4)	(4641.3)
Treat Yr. 2	6940.5	1031.7	9549.5*	3395.1	5330.4
	(4463.9)	(4994.7)	(5607.8)	(4034.2)	(4452.2)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		10945.3**	-4518.0	6341.5	-7.595
		(5189.5)	(7113.7)	(7656.8)	(8075.6)
Treat Yr. 3	-2873.9	-562.3	-2567.8	-297.1	1758.5
	(1912.2)	(2200.7)	(3083.1)	(1872.5)	(1882.6)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-4188.3*	231.5	-4464.5*	-7082.5**
		(2278.8)	(3343.6)	(2500.2)	(2977.2)
$I = 1$		0	10934.9***	-3818.3	13849.8***
		(.)	(3236.8)	(4273.8)	(3601.9)
Year 2	14368.5***	14368.5***	10126.7***	7389.1***	8231.5***
	(3137.2)	(3139.1)	(3669.5)	(2228.4)	(2891.0)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	6769.7	14414.8***	13753.8**
		(.)	(4802.7)	(5239.7)	(5939.6)
Year 3	-25817.8***	-25817.8***	-17341.9***	-17128.2***	-16493.1***
	(2538.3)	(2539.8)	(2464.1)	(1979.4)	(2316.5)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-13527.3***	-17947.3***	-20897.9***
		(.)	(3473.3)	(3382.6)	(4022.9)
Control Mean	30179.16	30179.16	20348.77	19649.23	19701.62
R-Squared	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.41	0.42
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 7 Column 2 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S22: Heterogeneity Analysis: Agricultural Sales

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	2230.9	4000.6	1888.0	387.6	697.9
	(2489.4)	(2757.0)	(3479.4)	(2126.8)	(2677.9)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		-3170.9	848.3	3575.0	2894.3
		(2681.9)	(4324.5)	(4528.9)	(4594.0)
Treat Yr. 2	3179.4	1900.0	10663.0**	3131.6	4897.8
	(3530.0)	(4181.4)	(4089.8)	(3026.7)	(3399.7)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		2299.1	-11910.9*	-358.5	-5697.7
		(4428.1)	(6462.0)	(7108.5)	(7049.6)
Treat Yr. 3	782.1	-319.1	5004.3	-1376.0	2016.7
	(3211.9)	(3555.1)	(4061.6)	(3239.7)	(3383.4)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		1979.6	-6600.4	4114.8	-2918.5
		(3397.0)	(5279.5)	(5188.8)	(5628.7)
$I = 1$		0	2333.9	-8764.7*	3826.7
		(.)	(3469.2)	(4534.6)	(3727.3)
Year 2	11726.2***	11726.2***	2900.3	4508.0***	4785.1**
	(2994.3)	(2996.6)	(2767.3)	(1629.6)	(1970.2)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	14235.4***	14098.1**	15356.6***
		(.)	(4721.4)	(5879.0)	(5594.5)
Year 3	6776.7***	6776.7***	1581.1	6136.9***	4827.2**
	(2489.7)	(2491.6)	(2537.5)	(2146.4)	(1911.2)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	8380.0**	1249.7	4312.9
		(.)	(4004.3)	(4170.1)	(4569.2)
Control Mean	13025.87	13025.87	8380.42	5980.69	7147.19
R-Squared	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.32
Observations	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 7 Column 3 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S23: Heterogeneity Analysis: Agricultural Costs

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result (1)	Farmer Group Member (2)	Grew Pulses Pre-Study (3)	Above Median Asset Index (4)	Above Median Land Owned (5)
Treat Yr. 1	2419.0	-1326.1	2157.0	-1817.7	-1444.3
	(3267.4)	(3939.6)	(4111.0)	(3433.1)	(3850.6)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		6973.2*	-150.1	8073.3*	5639.3
		(3907.1)	(5258.8)	(4601.3)	(5837.1)
Treat Yr. 2	4762.9	185.0	7202.1*	5661.9	5567.8
	(3440.0)	(3919.9)	(4303.3)	(3455.5)	(3669.9)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		8506.5**	-3995.1	-2332.9	-3820.9
		(3967.0)	(5851.8)	(5815.7)	(5902.5)
Treat Yr. 3	-2511.4	-2333.5	-493.9	-1275.3	708.6
	(1789.7)	(2044.1)	(2650.0)	(1762.0)	(1773.1)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-248.9	-2384.2	-1937.1	-4763.4
		(2142.5)	(3009.9)	(2546.7)	(2951.6)
$I = 1$		0	18151.7***	2185.6	18156.8***
		(.)	(3537.6)	(3904.9)	(4548.7)
Year 2	-455.7	-455.7	1362.0	-3211.7	-1979.8
	(2483.2)	(2484.7)	(3125.9)	(2573.1)	(2874.3)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	-2901.0	5692.1	3415.7
		(.)	(4252.5)	(3667.4)	(3474.3)
Year 3	-33990.7***	-33990.7***	-22657.7***	-24140.4***	-23901.2***
	(2754.7)	(2756.4)	(2928.4)	(2823.3)	(3156.1)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-18087.0***	-20344.4***	-22611.8***
		(.)	(3952.8)	(3283.2)	(4638.7)
Control Mean	52129.79	52129.79	38263.28	38744.81	38710.19
R-Squared	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.43	0.44
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 7 Column 4 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S24: Heterogeneity Analysis: Area Farmed

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.0839	-0.0439	0.102	-0.0240	0.119
	(0.0859)	(0.0982)	(0.111)	(0.0919)	(0.0819)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.239**	-0.0279	0.200	-0.141
		(0.113)	(0.158)	(0.164)	(0.164)
Treat Yr. 2	0.112	-0.000588	0.0948	0.000723	0.0145
	(0.103)	(0.122)	(0.128)	(0.145)	(0.129)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.210	0.0230	0.202	0.148
		(0.132)	(0.187)	(0.210)	(0.203)
Treat Yr. 3	0.00620	-0.0858	0.195	0.0761	0.116
	(0.101)	(0.116)	(0.128)	(0.113)	(0.106)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		0.173	-0.290	-0.157	-0.233
		(0.111)	(0.180)	(0.191)	(0.171)
$I = 1$		0	0.382***	-0.349**	0.781***
		(.)	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.133)
Year 2	0.243***	0.243***	0.234***	0.194*	0.348***
	(0.0811)	(0.0811)	(0.0806)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.0154	0.101	-0.235
		(.)	(0.135)	(0.155)	(0.177)
Year 3	0.0303	0.0303	-0.0295	-0.0166	0.187**
	(0.0800)	(0.0801)	(0.0839)	(0.0845)	(0.0872)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	0.0955	0.0970	-0.351**
		(.)	(0.140)	(0.164)	(0.142)
Control Mean	1.38	1.38	0.89	1.01	0.81
R-Squared	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.35
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 7 Column 5 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S25: Heterogeneity Analysis: Agricultural Earnings Index

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.135	0.0216	0.121	-0.0497	0.0279
	(0.104)	(0.124)	(0.133)	(0.0997)	(0.113)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.212*	0.0134	0.357**	0.148
		(0.127)	(0.176)	(0.159)	(0.184)
Treat Yr. 2	0.215	0.0261	0.360**	0.149	0.192
	(0.147)	(0.165)	(0.168)	(0.144)	(0.148)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.350**	-0.238	0.103	-0.0619
		(0.171)	(0.244)	(0.268)	(0.275)
Treat Yr. 3	-0.0523	-0.0646	0.0752	0.00817	0.0886
	(0.0826)	(0.0952)	(0.119)	(0.0921)	(0.0878)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		0.0256	-0.178	-0.112	-0.241
		(0.0985)	(0.149)	(0.140)	(0.148)
$I = 1$		0	0.519***	-0.252	0.689***
		(.)	(0.125)	(0.155)	(0.142)
Year 2	0.371***	0.371***	0.227**	0.142*	0.221**
	(0.0938)	(0.0938)	(0.103)	(0.0849)	(0.0940)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.230	0.475***	0.338**
		(.)	(0.152)	(0.162)	(0.159)
Year 3	-0.674***	-0.674***	-0.489***	-0.478***	-0.399***
	(0.0724)	(0.0724)	(0.0868)	(0.0712)	(0.0738)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-0.295**	-0.405***	-0.616***
		(.)	(0.126)	(0.111)	(0.120)
Control Mean					
R-Squared	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.44
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 7 Column 6 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S26: Heterogeneity Analysis: Pulse Stock (Kgs.)

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result (1)	Farmer Group Member (2)	Grew Pulses Pre-Study (3)	Above Median Asset Index (4)	Above Median Land Owned (5)
Treat Yr. 1	1.083	0.0507	0.0736	0.0335	0.419
	(0.693)	(0.759)	(0.635)	(0.674)	(0.580)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		1.928**	1.501	2.128*	0.964
		(0.743)	(1.057)	(1.211)	(1.323)
Treat Yr. 2	0.516	-0.699	0.681	0.119	0.475
	(0.836)	(0.857)	(0.866)	(0.833)	(0.752)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		2.264***	-0.309	0.792	-0.229
		(0.838)	(1.175)	(1.609)	(1.530)
Treat Yr. 3	0.209	-0.351	0.716	0.258	0.404
	(0.417)	(0.443)	(0.479)	(0.453)	(0.468)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		1.058**	-0.666	-0.0120	-0.162
		(0.414)	(0.669)	(0.742)	(0.803)
$I = 1$		0	2.228***	-0.480	3.332***
		(.)	(0.834)	(1.033)	(1.095)
Year 2	0.792	0.792	0.222	0.283	0.805
	(0.600)	(0.601)	(0.606)	(0.642)	(0.559)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.911	1.051	-0.0299
		(.)	(1.016)	(1.298)	(1.396)
Year 3	-2.141***	-2.141***	-1.205**	-1.695***	-0.493
	(0.556)	(0.556)	(0.463)	(0.468)	(0.426)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-1.493*	-0.920	-3.692***
		(.)	(0.790)	(0.877)	(1.180)
Control Mean	4.38	4.38	1.73	3.00	1.99
R-Squared	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.18
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 8 Column 1 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S27: Heterogeneity Analysis: Pulse Stock (Months)

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.371*	0.197	0.113	0.271	0.193
	(0.218)	(0.255)	(0.272)	(0.267)	(0.233)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.324	0.373	0.179	0.225
		(0.255)	(0.373)	(0.410)	(0.363)
Treat Yr. 2	0.429**	0.141	0.375	0.142	0.300
	(0.192)	(0.218)	(0.251)	(0.240)	(0.225)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.534**	0.0700	0.564	0.183
		(0.219)	(0.316)	(0.376)	(0.357)
Treat Yr. 3	0.0201	0.0639	-0.00424	0.0518	0.127*
	(0.0824)	(0.0956)	(0.0976)	(0.0742)	(0.0725)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-0.0766	0.0802	-0.0480	-0.120
		(0.0860)	(0.0938)	(0.0896)	(0.0886)
$I = 1$		0	0.672**	0.127	1.126***
		(.)	(0.279)	(0.307)	(0.283)
Year 2	-0.108	-0.108	-0.0932	0.0675	0.0571
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.198)	(0.238)	(0.223)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	-0.0229	-0.362	-0.369
		(.)	(0.345)	(0.397)	(0.388)
Year 3	-1.278***	-1.278***	-0.737***	-0.877***	-0.646***
	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.208)	(0.187)	(0.168)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-0.864***	-0.829***	-1.418***
		(.)	(0.283)	(0.301)	(0.286)
Control Mean	1.24	1.24	0.70	0.81	0.65
R-Squared	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.19
Observations	2511	2511	2511	2511	2511

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 8 Column 2 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S28: Heterogeneity Analysis:Weekly Pulse Consumption

		Interaction ($I=1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	12.69	24.40	20.18	7.391	-38.75
	(37.08)	(48.03)	(54.09)	(41.63)	(50.29)
Treat Y1*($I=1$)		-21.80	-12.81	7.433	103.5
		(48.53)	(64.94)	(61.50)	(71.43)
Treat Yr. 2	-20.83	-17.36	-22.45	-28.44	-49.84**
	(17.73)	(20.98)	(27.14)	(26.72)	(24.80)
Treat Y2*($I=1$)		-6.592	2.992	15.43	63.11*
		(17.95)	(30.99)	(33.18)	(34.19)
Treat Yr. 3	-12.84	-5.977	-42.19	-18.50	-29.57
	(19.15)	(24.52)	(28.89)	(27.44)	(27.52)
Treat Y3*($I=1$)		-12.78	46.31	12.20	37.33
		(23.59)	(35.26)	(34.34)	(36.76)
$I=1$		0	40.19	38.65	-18.59
		(.)	(47.39)	(48.42)	(51.86)
Year 2	-130.2***	-130.2***	-108.6***	-88.03**	-121.3***
	(27.87)	(27.89)	(37.00)	(36.40)	(37.14)
Y2*($I=1$)		0	-34.44	-86.96	-19.87
		(.)	(53.56)	(56.35)	(50.97)
Year 3	-86.70***	-86.69***	-45.46	-43.10	-84.90**
	(29.90)	(29.92)	(41.75)	(35.40)	(38.03)
Y3*($I=1$)		0	-65.65	-90.15*	-4.062
		(.)	(53.86)	(53.56)	(53.38)
Control Mean	399.79	399.79	347.98	345.48	390.63
R-Squared	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16
Observations	2469	2469	2469	2469	2469

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 8 Column 3 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S29: Heterogeneity Analysis: Daily Protein Consumption (Household)

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.0603	-0.129	-1.066	0.533	-1.030
	(1.049)	(1.401)	(1.345)	(1.290)	(1.424)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.358	1.956	-0.929	2.658
		(1.438)	(1.391)	(1.462)	(1.696)
Treat Yr. 2	-2.259	-3.015	-6.682*	-2.618	-3.154
	(2.991)	(3.586)	(3.410)	(3.198)	(2.620)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		1.401	6.830	0.617	1.338
		(3.092)	(5.458)	(5.629)	(6.569)
Treat Yr. 3	-4.269	-4.217	-4.986	-5.830	-0.223
	(4.139)	(4.617)	(3.216)	(6.349)	(5.358)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-0.0828	0.974	3.199	-8.782
		(3.016)	(6.903)	(7.266)	(8.536)
$I = 1$		0	0.490	-1.110	-3.410**
		(.)	(1.168)	(2.010)	(1.618)
Year 2	5.174**	5.174**	4.861	3.848	2.180
	(2.583)	(2.585)	(3.240)	(2.864)	(2.312)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.510	2.731	6.705
		(.)	(5.107)	(5.154)	(5.903)
Year 3	8.800**	8.800**	5.051	9.905*	4.096
	(3.707)	(3.709)	(3.074)	(5.668)	(4.088)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	5.977	-2.286	10.59
		(.)	(6.603)	(6.498)	(7.848)
Control Mean	14.80	14.80	14.09	15.36	15.35
R-Squared	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Observations	2469	2469	2469	2469	2469

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 8 Column 4 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S30: Heterogeneity Analysis: Daily Protein Consumption (Female)

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0	0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Treat Yr. 2	-11.19	-16.84	-46.24	-1.777	-28.95
	(19.08)	(23.92)	(43.54)	(23.73)	(25.39)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		10.50	55.45	-19.68	37.09
		(19.60)	(49.02)	(37.19)	(39.94)
Treat Yr. 3	-5.740	-5.467	-10.85	-9.506	19.05
	(17.81)	(20.73)	(18.25)	(22.18)	(19.96)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-0.391	7.199	7.127	-52.52
		(17.51)	(31.34)	(30.39)	(37.51)
$I = 1$		0	21.66	-11.32	32.00
		(.)	(26.88)	(27.78)	(30.16)
Year 2	-0.420	-0.412	34.95	-8.836	23.91
	(23.09)	(23.10)	(41.81)	(28.38)	(30.35)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	-56.45	17.32	-54.48
		(.)	(49.11)	(40.90)	(45.63)
Year 3	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	0	0	0
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Control Mean	99.62	99.62	113.51	83.68	98.19
R-Squared	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Observations	1629	1629	1629	1629	1629

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 8 Column 5 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.

Table S31: Heterogeneity Analysis: Pulse Consumption Index

		Interaction ($I = 1$)			
	Main Result	Farmer Group Member	Grew Pulses Pre-Study	Above Median Asset Index	Above Median Land Owned
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treat Yr. 1	0.124	0.00530	-0.00861	0.00915	-0.0136
	(0.0927)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.0956)	(0.0875)
Treat Y1*($I = 1$)		0.219**	0.192	0.221	0.221
		(0.108)	(0.149)	(0.154)	(0.170)
Treat Yr. 2	0.0506	-0.119	0.0493	-0.0353	0.00745
	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.111)	(0.0971)
Treat Y2*($I = 1$)		0.314***	-0.00796	0.166	0.0430
		(0.106)	(0.152)	(0.209)	(0.199)
Treat Yr. 3	-0.0810	0.0327	-0.196*	-0.140*	-0.0303
	(0.0746)	(0.0837)	(0.103)	(0.0801)	(0.0754)
Treat Y3*($I = 1$)		-0.205**	0.200	0.139	-0.0449
		(0.0812)	(0.124)	(0.121)	(0.0993)
$I = 1$		0	0.346***	0.0439	0.443***
		(.)	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.146)
Year 2	-0.0350	-0.0350	-0.0810	-0.0331	-0.0297
	(0.0728)	(0.0729)	(0.0855)	(0.0914)	(0.0870)
Y2*($I = 1$)		0	0.0728	-0.00433	-0.0125
		(.)	(0.142)	(0.171)	(0.188)
Year 3	-0.797***	-0.797***	-0.427***	-0.504***	-0.489***
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.0992)	(0.0938)
Y3*($I = 1$)		0	-0.589***	-0.606***	-0.690***
		(.)	(0.160)	(0.173)	(0.169)
Control Mean					
R-Squared	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.26
Observations	2469	2469	2469	2469	2469

Notes: This table reproduces results form Table 8 Column 6 and explores heterogeneity along various dimensions. Column 2 separates treated households by the endogenous decision to participate in the farmer group. Column 3 separates by prior experience with pulses. Column 4 separates by above/below median asset ownership. Column 5 separates by above/below median land ownership.